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Study programme: Computer Science
Study branch: Artificial Intelligence
Prague 2020
I declare that I carried out this master thesis independently, and only with the
cited sources, literature and other professional sources. It has not been used to
obtain another or the same degree.
I understand that my work relates to the rights and obligations under the Act
No. 121/2000 Sb., the Copyright Act, as amended, in particular the fact that the
Charles University has the right to conclude a license agreement on the use of this
work as a school work pursuant to Section 60 subsection 1 of the Copyright Act.
In . . . . . . . . . . . . . date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Author’s signature
i
I would like to thank my supervisor, Mgr. Marta Vomlelová, Ph.D., for her
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Abstrakt: Ćılem této práce je prozkoumat problematiku detekce útok̊u na poč́ıta-
čové systémy a vytvořit jednoduchá pravidla, která jsou schopna detekovat jed-
notlivé útoky. Útoky jsou prozkoumány na realistickém datasetu CSE-CIC-
IDS2018. Nejprve se práce zabývá analýzou datasetu. V analýze jsou spoč́ıtány
r̊uzné statistiky datasetu a na závěr jsou otestované r̊uzné metody redukce di-
menźı pro zobrazeńı dat v dvou demenzionálńım prostoru. Po analýze následuje
př́ıprava a normalizace dat. Proces trénováńı se pak zaměřuje na výběr vhodných
př́ıznak̊u a hledáńı nejlepš́ıho modelu. Stejné př́ıznaky jsou pak použity i pro
vytvářeńı pravidel. Pravidla jsou extrahována ze souboru rozhodovaćıch stromů.
V závěru práce jsou pravidla porovnána s nejlepš́ım modelem. Experimenty
ukazuj́ı, že jednoduchá pravidla jsou schopna dosáhnout podobných výsledk̊u
jako nejlepš́ı model. Mohou být použita v pravidlových systémech pro detekci
útok̊u nebo nasazena jako jednoduchý model.
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Introduction
Many companies and people are interested in IT security. Since the first bigger
computer systems and computer networks were created, IT security became im-
portant, but these days it is much more important than before. Many services
are dependent on some computer systems and without these computer systems
they are not able to work. We all are tied together with computers that we even
can not imagine losing our phones or the Internet and services on it, but this
is not everything. Everyone has some private data somewhere in data storage,
which may be, but it does not have to be, connected to the Internet. These data
are also very important for us and we do not want to provide them to someone
unauthorized. There are people that want to get access to the private data or
want to cause a damage to some services. That is why everyone wants to protect
their own services and their own data. This is the reason why some researchers
are interested in IT security and try to improve it.
However, IT security is a general term and we can imagine many things, which
can be called IT security. In one point of view, it can be a building of secured
networks, computer systems or even secured warehouses with a data storage. In
another point of view, it can be some mechanism of intrusion detection or anomaly
detection. An intrusion detection system (IDS) can monitor our environment and
detect if something strange is happening. It can provide a possibility to defend
ourselves. The biggest problem is that it is impossible to create a 100% secured
area. It is always trade off between security and price for security as one well-
known graph explains (see Figure 1). It basically says the more resources are
invested, the more secured area is, but as Figure 1 demonstrates, an area never
will be secured for 100%. People will always have to deal with a question what
level of security is enough for us. However, in some level of security, an intrusion
is not worth it or is very expensive.
Intrusion detection will be always needed at least until someone will create
a 100% secured computer system. This work focuses on intrusion detection. In-
trusion detection is a very popular subject in IT security. Attackers create new
intrusions and new methods, so researchers in IT security have to create new
defense and adapt intrusion detection systems. With the rise of machine learning
(ML) many researchers tried to apply it on this problem, but ML needs data to
learn to detect an intrusion. Creating a good and realistic dataset for intrusion
detection is not easy. Many datasets were proposed, but some of them con-
tains anonymous data or are not very realistic. The Communications Security
Establishment and the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity dealt with creat-
ing suitable datasets and the CSE-CIC-IDS2018[1][2] dataset was created. This
dataset is used for creating ML models.
ML models for intrusion detection are mapped very well, especially ML models
that are trained on the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset. However, not every ML model
can be easily interpreted. A ML model is usually black box, which takes an input
and gives us a prediction, but what if a human expert wants to know how it
decided and wants to understand the intrusion. One solution may be to use
a simple and understandable ML model such as Decision Tree. In Decision Tree,
it is easier to track its decisions, but the model may be still too complex. It brings
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Figure 1: Trade off between security and price.
us to the second solution – creating a set of simple and short rules. Rules are
logical formulas, which can define an intrusion and are very easy to understand.
However, they may be less powerful than other ML models. The objective of
this work is to create simple and short rules for each type of the intrusion in the
dataset and to achieve similar results as the best ML model achieves.
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Related Work
The CSE-CIC-IDS2018[1][2] dataset is not the first dataset created by the Com-
munications Security Establishment and the Canadian Institute for Cybersecu-
rity. They created another similar intrusion detection datasets. One of them
is called CICIDS2017[3][4]. Both datasets are created in the same way. How-
ever, the CICIDS2017 dataset simulates only five days of attacking and normal
activity and the simulated network is small in comparison with the CSE-CIC-
IDS2018 dataset. The CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset simulates ten days of attacking
and normal activity. Its simulated network consists of several subnets to get a
network similar to real-world networks. In addition to the CICIDS2017 dataset,
Iman Sharafaldin et al.[5] propose several ML models. They mainly focus on
analyzing the dataset. Before training the ML models, they study feature impor-
tance of each intrusion in the dataset and suggest which features are the most
important. For extracting feature importance, they use Random Forest. Random
Forest is also used in the final testing of the most important features together
with K-Nearest Neighbors, ID3, Adaboost, Multilayer perceptron, Naive-Bayes
and Quadratic Discriminant Analysis. Their results show that Random Forest
is the best ML model for their dataset. At the end of their work, they compare
available datasets and show in what their dataset differs.
The CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset is studied by Qianru Zhou and Dimitrios
Pezaros[6]. In their work, they use the same ML models as in [5]. ML mod-
els are trained on the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset, but for testing, they use their
real-life traffic data. The results show that the best classifier is Decision Tree,
but also other ML models perform well.
V. Kanimozhi and T. P. Jacob[7] propose Multilayer Perceptron. They focus
only on Botnet intrusion and hyper-parameter optimization. They achieve similar
results, as in [6].
There is also a different approach. T. Chadza et al. propose Hidden Markov
Model[8]. They study the detection accuracy of determining all states, the current
state, and the prediction of the next state of an observation sequence. For training
they use two algorithms Baum Welch and Viterbi Training. For initialization
of the Hidden Markov Model, they use three methods – random, uniform and
count-based. At the end of their work, they present a comparison of initialization
methods and their influence on accuracy.
Before the datasets created by the Communications Security Establishment
and the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity, there were one more widely used
dataset for the evaluation an IDS. The dataset is called KDD Cup 1999[9] or
also only KDD’99. It consists of 4 898 431 network traffics and each traffic has
41 features. The network traffics are divided into 5 categorizes. Each category
represents a group of attacks with similar characteristics. One of the category
is normal activity. In total there are 22 attacks. It is old dataset and it was
sometimes criticized that the data are too ”artificial”.
The fact that the dataset is too ”artificial” is partially discussed by Ugo Fiore
et al.[10]. They realize that the environment, where IDS has to work, is very
variable. The attacks differ, new attacks are coming and each network is dif-
ferent. The main goal was to provide a more adequate description of network
5
traffic and to be as adaptive as possible. For this reason, they propose semi-
supervised anomaly detection with using Discriminative Restricted Boltzmann
Machine (DRBM) that is an energy-based, generative model not restricted to any
specific environment, or a priori knowledge base. The training, in semi-supervised
anomaly detection, contains only samples representing normal activity. Then
what can not be characterized as normal activity is marked as anomalous. They
did two experiments. The first experiment was to train and test the DRBM on
the real data. The second experiment was to train the DRBM on the KDD’99
dataset and to test it on the real data. At the end of their work, they compare
the results from the both experiments and show that the performance suffers if
the classifier is tested in the different network than where it was trained.
The Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) is also used in another form. The
RBMs are stacked to create Deep Belief Neural Network (DBN). The DBN is a
generative neural network. Mostafa A. Salama et al.[11] use the DBN as a di-
mensionality reduction method together with SVM classifier. The whole model
is trained on the NSL-KDD dataset. It is only the improved KDD’99 dateset.
The goal is to classify 5 different groups of attacks. First, they study how well
the DBN works as a dimensionality reduction method. It is compared to PCA,
Gain Ratio and chi square. For each case, the SVM is used as a classifier. The
results demonstrate that the best dimensionality reduction method is the DBN.
Then they compare three classifiers – SVM, DBN and combination of DBN and
SVM. The models are trained on three different sizes of the training set. Only
20%, 30% and 40% of the dataset is used for the training. The experiments show
that the performance of models is improving with increasing size of the training
set. At the end of their work, the combination of DBN and SVM is proposed
as the best model. However, the DBN is also used by Md. Zahangir Alom et
al.[12]. In their work, the DBN is used only as a classifier. It is trained on the
same dataset with the same sizes of the training set. Their DBN performs better
than the models in [11].
Jihyun Kim et al.[13] use different approach. To take in account long term
dependencies, they use Long Short Term Memory (LSTM). The LSTM is a re-
current neural network (RNN) that improves the problem with a vanishing and
exploding gradient in the back propagation training of a RNN. The LSTM is
trained on the KDD’99 dataset but on the version of the dataset with only 10%
of data. It is trained to detect 5 different groups of attacks. First, they search
for optimal hyper-parameters and then they test the trained LSTM. The LSTM
achieves very good results. Wafaa Anani and Jagath Samarabandu[14] study effi-
ciency of the different types of LSTM architecture. The architectures are – LSTM,
Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU), Bidirectional LSTM (Bi-LSTM) and Skip-RNN.
To train the models, they use the KDD’99 10% dataset. The training does not
use all features but only twelve the most important features. Importance of the
features is computed by Random Forest that is very effective on the KDD’99
dataset. At the end of their work, they present results for 100, 500 and 1000
training cycles. The LSTM outperforms all architectures. Only for 1000 training
cycles, the LSTM is outperformed by the GRU. The LSTM performance is better
than performance of previous mentioned models for the KDD’99 dataset.
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Outline
This work is structured as follows. Chapter 1 summarizes information about the
dataset – the dataset origin, features and goal classes. The chapter also includes
intrusions overview to have some idea about various ways of attacking. Chapter 2
reviews the Machine Learning theory. It describes the basic concepts of Machine
Learning and its goals. It also discusses various types of ML models, which are
used in experiments and for comparison with rules. The ML models discussion
is followed by reviewing the method for creating rules. The chapter ends with
a short discussion about unsupervised learning. Chapter 3 presents the model
training. It goes through the process of data preprocessing, data visualization,
feature selection and ends with the training of several models. The last chapter is
Chapter 4. It discusses rules creation and presents the final rules. The rules are
created for each intrusion and use only the most important features. In addition
to the rules creation, the rules are compared to the best ML model.
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1. Intrusion Detection Dataset
This chapter covers the basic properties of the CSE-CIC-IDS2018[1][2] dataset.
Section 1.1 summarizes how the dataset is created and how the intrusions are
simulated. In Section 1.2, it continues with the data description. It describes the
content of the dataset, its features and classes. The chapter ends with Section
1.3 focusing on the intrusions overview. Let us now look at the dataset closer.
As mentioned before, there are many datasets. The rules are inferred from
the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset. The CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset is one of the
datasets for intrusion detection systems (IDS). It is created by the Communica-
tions Security Establishment (CSE) and the Canadian Institute for Cybersecu-
rity (CIC). They focus on creating a realistic dataset with not anonymous data
that most of such datasets contain. They also propose a method of dynamic
dataset creation. It means not to create only one static dataset, but to be able
to easily create a dataset in anytime and for any network topology. The CSE-
CIC-IDS2018 dataset is not their first dataset. They have two more datasets
related to IDS. First one is the CICIDS2017[3] dataset and the second one is the
ISCXIDS2012[15] dataset. The datasets are created using a similar method as in
the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset, but the dataset from 2018 uses different network
topology and the network is simulated on AWS[2] (Amazon Web Services).
Figure 1.1: Network topology[1].
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1.1 Dataset Creation
CSE and CIC did not only create the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset but also came
up with a method how to easily generate datasets for specific needs with different
network protocols and topology. The main idea is to extract characteristics from
a normal activity and from an activity when someone tries to attack a network.
Based on these characteristics, called profiles, agents, or human operators are
able to generate specific events in a network. Using various machine learning
methods and statistical analysis techniques, they put together two profiles. The
first B-profile is profile describing the activity of usual users. With this profile it
is possible to generate benign flow. The second M-profile is profile describing an
attack scenario in an unambiguous manner. They considered six different attack
scenario – DoS, Web Attack, Infiltration, Botnet, DDoS and Brute Force Attack.
First of all, they prepared a test environment to generate the final dataset.
The test environment was a common LAN network on the AWS computing plat-
form. To be close to some real network as much as possible, they divided the LAN
network into five subnets and used 20-100 machines in each subnet. Each subnet
contained various machines with various operating systems. Attacker’s network
was outside of the LAN network. Attacker’s network contained fifty machines to
be able to attack from one or more machines. The whole network topology can
be seen in Figure 1.1. Then they simulated a normal activity and intrusions for
ten days. Each day was recorded. They recorded the whole flow. However, raw
data are not suitable for ML models. The data has to be prepared for ML models
first. They used their feature extractor CICFlowMeter-V3[16] and extracted 80
features for ML models.
1.2 Description
The dataset is divided into ten days. For each day they provide separate files.
In the files, we can find specific intrusions and a normal activity called benign.
To provide a possibility to create a new feature extractor or use different feature
extractor the dataset consists of two types of files. The first type contains only
raw data. Raw data contain both network packets and event logs from machines.
Network packets are stored in pcap files used for analyzing a network. It is not
possible to use directly raw data for machine learning, that is why they also
provide the second type of files – CSV. CSV files contain 80 extracted features
together with labels (see Table A.2). The list of files and what intrusions they
contain is attached in Attachment A.1. The features contain basic information
such as Protocol, Destination Port, Timestamp and then many statistics describ-
ing data flow. Some features contain invalid values, specifically infinity (inf ) and
not a number (nan). Also some features have only one distinct value.
The dataset contains common and well-known intrusions. It has 15 classes.
One of them is Benign representing a normal activity and rest of them are various
types of intrusions. The main types of intrusions are Brute Force, Denial of
Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), SQL Injection, Infiltration,
Web Attacks and Botnet. The main types are then divided into classes based on
which software is used to make the intrusion. Some of the classes do not have very
large occurrence. The dataset has 16 232 943 samples and size approximately 7
9
GB. Below you can see the list of classes, their occurrence and in Figure 1.2 their
ratio.
• Benign - 13 484 708 (83.0700139%)
• Bot - 286 191 (1.7630260%)
• Infiltration - 161 934 (0.9975640%)
• SQL Injection - 87 (0.0005359%)
• Brute Force -Web - 611 (0.0037640%)
• Brute Force -XSS - 230 (0.0014169%)
• FTP Brute Force - 193 360 (1.1911580%)
• SSH Brute Force - 187 589 (1.1556068%)
• DDoS attack-HOIC - 686 012 (4.2260482%)
• DDoS attack-LOIC-UDP - 1 730 (0.0106573%)
• DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP - 576 191 (3.5495166%)
• DoS attacks-Hulk - 461 912 (2.8455222%)
• DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTest - 139 890 (0.8617661%)
• DoS attacks-Slowloris - 10 990 (0.0677018%)
• DoS attacks-GoldenEye - 41 508 (0.2557022%)
Figure 1.2: Classes ratio.
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1.3 Intrusions
This section discusses how specific intrusions differs from each other and how
intrusions look like. With knowledge about intrusions, it may be easier to look
for an anomaly in the data. Below are only common intrusions contained in the
dataset, but in the real world can be found many other intrusions. Attackers
permanently adapt to new defense and develop new methods of how to get to
their target.
Botnet
The word botnet[17] comes from two words robot and network. Attacker’s objec-
tive is to infect computers in the targeted network with malicious software and
join them into a network of robots. After that, they are able to control these
computers and can make various types of attack. With many controlled comput-
ers, it is easy to make DDoS attack, but also it is possible to steal data or sell an
access to them. If someone becomes a part of botnet attack, they may be legally
responsible for the consequences[18].
For simulating botnet, attack they used two software in the dataset. The first
software is Zeus. Zeus is a Trojan horse malware used mainly for stealing data like
banking information or keystroke. As a complement, they used second software
Ares botnet which is capable of running remote commands, download/upload
and other useful actions. After infecting computers, they requested screenshots
from them every 400 seconds and nothing more.
Brute Force Attack
The whole idea of a brute force attack is trial-and-error[19]. This type of attack
is used for a password and encryption key cracking. There is nothing clever
on this method. As the name of the attack suggests, it is only a brute force
method. It may take a lot of time to complete the attack successfully. On the
other hand, for some situations, it is enough and it works very well. A simple
example is a password cracking when every combination is tried to find the correct
password.
There are many tools for brute force attack. They chose Patator, which is
written in Python, to implement a brute force attack in this dataset. They
implemented two types of attack FTP and SSH. Attacks were coming from Kali
Linux system and were aimed at Ubuntu 14.0 system. They also had a large
dictionary with 90 million words for a password cracking.
Denial of Service (DoS)
Each service or computer system has some limited capacity to handle requests
from users. If service or computer system receives too many requests, it becomes
slower or it can even crash. Denial of Service attack (DoS) aims to get a target
to this situation. The attack comes from one machine and tries overwhelming
or flooding a target. DoS attack has two typical categories[20] – buffer overflow
attack and flood attack. Buffer overflow attack tries to consume all available
resources such as hard disk space, memory or CPU time. In flood attack, the
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objective is to create a big amount of packets sent to a server, which cause server
oversaturating.
In this scenario, they used the Slowloris Perl-based tool to take down a web
server with the minimal bandwidth and side effects. The attack was led by a single
machine.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
As can be deduced from the name of the attack it is a similar attack like DoS.
The only difference is that the attack is led from multiple machines. For this
purpose, botnet attack can be used to take a control over multiple machines and
organize them to attack some server. In the dataset, they used two tools – High
Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC) and Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC). For example, the
attack with HOIC was led from 4 computers.
Infiltration
Infiltration is the type of attack which tries to do a damage or map a network
from inside. Typically this is done by sending some malicious software to someone
in a network and creating a backdoor. Then the attacker can access a network
from the backdoor and scan its topology. To implement this type of attack, they
used a malicious document. The document was sent by email and then they were
able to map a network.
Web Attacks
Web attacks are a group of attacks targeting on web pages. Into this group can
be included, for example, cross-site scripting[21] (XSS) or SQL injection[22]. XSS
attack aims at the user’s web browser. It tries to run some malicious script on the
user’s side. The user may find these scripts during usual browsing the Internet.
A malicious script might be injected using a web page’s input. If some web
page does not check an input and use that to generate an output, it may be in
a risk. Common targets are web pages with forums, comments or message boards.
Compared to SQL Injection, SQL Injection aims at databases behind a web page.
It tries to go around an authentication and authorization and manipulate with
data using SQL statements. Without a good protection, the attacker may add,
delete or modify records in the database or even retrieve some sensitive data.
SQL Injection is one of the oldest attack.
To simulate this type of attack, they used web application Damn Vulnerable
Web App (DVWA), which is vulnerable and used for testing, teaching and helping
to better understand the process of securing a web application. They implemented
SQL Injection attack, XSS attack and some brute force attacks. For automation
attacks, they developed a code with Selenium framework.
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2. Machine Learning
This chapter reviews the Machine Learning theory. The Machine Learning theory
and its goals are introduced in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 discusses the supervised
learning. It goes through the training process, loss functions and regulariza-
tion, metrics and ends with presenting several Machine Learning models and the
method for creating rules. Section 2.3 discusses the unsupervised learning. It
focuses mainly on methods for the dimensionality reduction, that are helpful in
the data visualization. Let us start with an introduction.
2.1 Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) are popular and quickly grow-
ing fields of research. People are trying to apply ML and DL on various kinds
of problems. A current very popular field of research is, for example, natural
language processing (NLP), where researchers try to create models, that are able
to understand natural languages such as English language or Czech language. In
this field of research, many problems can be found, such as language translation,
sentiment analysis or smart assistants. Another popular field of research is Auto-
mated Machine Learning (AutoML), which tries to automate the process of ML
and make ML accessible for everyone.
Both ML and DL study how the computer can learn to do some task. The
task can be, for example, NLP, AutoML or something less complex like simple
logical function AND or OR. This work focuses on ML. DL is more associated
with large and complex artificial neural networks, but they are not necessary
here. There are many definitions of ML, that have various point of views, but let
us mention only one definition. American computer scientist Tom M. Mitchell
defines the computer learning as: ”A computer program is said to learn from
experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P
if its performance at tasks in T , as measured by P , improves with experience
E.” [23]. Task T is already clear, but others are not. Let task T be intrusion
detection then experience E is correctly and incorrectly detected intrusions and
performance measure P can be how many intrusions are correctly detected. ML
needs some examples to get experience E.
In this work, the main objective is to use ML to detect intrusions and explore
their characteristics. ML needs data to learn something. Let X ∈ Rn×m be
data with n rows and m columns. Rows are called samples. Each sample is m
dimensional row vector xi ∈ Rm. The elements of the vector xi = (xi1, xi2, ..., xim)
are called features or attributes. In the case of intrusion detection features are
the destination port, protocol and all statistics about a flow.
In some cases of ML, only data X are provided. Data X do not have any
information about what each sample means. Based on what is provided, four
types of ML are differentiated – supervised learning, unsupervised learning, semi-
supervised learning and reinforcement learning. This work uses only supervised
learning and unsupervised learning.
Supervised learning also called learning with a teacher, is a method, which
uses data X and their labels. Labels are defined as a column vector Y ∈ Rn and
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Y T = (y1, y2, ..., yn). It tries to learn to predict for a sample xi a value yi. If Y is
a real vector, it is called regression. Examples of regression tasks are predicting
stock price, house price or the age of person. If Y is a discrete vector, it means
Y ∈ ζn, where ζ is a finite set of possible outcomes, then it is called classification.
Intrusion detection is an example of classification. In intrusion detection the set
ζ can have two forms. In case of predicting only if it is an intrusion or not, ζ has
only two values {0, 1}. This type of classification is called a binary classification.
Predicting 0 means it is not an intrusion and predicting 1 means the opposite.
However, an intrusion detection system can have requirements also to detect what
type of an intrusion it is. In this case, ζ can have more than two values. It is
called multiclass or multinomial classification.
Not every data X are labeled. Someone has to label the data. It requires
many people for big data and for specific data, it requires people with knowledge
about the problem. ML has to deal with unlabeled data too. Even without labels,
ML should be able to extract some information from the data. Learning without
labels is called unsupervised learning. In this case, ML has no information about
what it is. In unsupervised learning, ML tries to find relations, similarities and
guess possible classes, which might or might not correspond to the reality. In
intrusion detection, it can be applied to discovering how many different behaviors
are in the data. Then some human expert can say that some behaviors are usual
and some are not usual. Based on cooperation ML and the human expert, the
data can be easily split into negative and positive samples without seeing each
sample. Other unsupervised learning methods help with the data visualization
and dimensionality reduction. Graphs can represent a maximum of 3-dimensional
space, but samples may have tens, hundreds or even thousands dimensions. These
methods can reduce their dimensions and preserve some of their dependencies.
Let us now go through supervised and unsupervised learning.
2.2 Supervised Learning
The general concept of supervised learning is to find a hypothesis h. Let χ be a set
of all possible samples of a machine learning problem and ζ be a set of all possible
outcomes for the classification problem. Then the hypothesis h can be defined
as a function h : χ → R for regression and h : χ → ζ for classification[24]. The
process of learning can be defined as searching for the most suitable hypothesis
h in the space of hypotheses H. For finding such a hypothesis, it needs data and
a performance measure. Let X ⊆ χ and |X| = n be some data and Y ∈ Rn
or Y ∈ ζn be their labels, then the performance measure can be defined as
function f : Y, Ŷ → R, where Ŷ are hypothesis’s predictions h(X) = Ŷ . The
measure defines what the hypothesis should learn, the objective. Performance
measures that measure the error of hypothesis are called loss functions or also
error functions. These functions are important in optimizing and searching for the
most suitable hypothesis. However, these functions are not suitable for measuring
how much the hypothesis is accurate. For this purpose, there are various accuracy
functions or also called metrics. Some of them are similar to loss functions, but
some of them give different results.
ML has many different models and each of them has different capabilities.
Some of them are more complex and able to learn more difficult tasks and the
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others are less complex, but may be faster and interpretable. It does not mean
that the most complex model is the best model. For some tasks, it is more
preferable to understand why some decisions were made, but this is not the only
reason. A set χ may contain some noise. It can be noise from some sensors, or
it can be mistakes during a measurement. A more complex model is capable of
learning more things than a simpler model, so more complex model may learn even
the noise and then provide incorrect predictions. This phenomenon is referred
to overfitting. On the other hand, a simpler model does not have to be able to
learn difficult problems. This is called underfitting. There is always a question
how complex model to choose, but there is one rule defined by Occam’s razor.
Here the paraphrased Occam’s razor is: ”The simplest solution is most likely the
right one.”. The simplest model capable of learning the problem is most likely
the right one.
2.2.1 Training Process
The whole process of choosing and training a model starts with a data prepro-
cessing. Usually data come in a raw form not suitable for training a model. The
data preprocessing contains several phases. First of all, if data are in a raw form,
features have to be extracted. For example, in the CSE-CIC-IDS2018[1] dataset
features are extracted using CICFlowMeter-V3[16]. Most of the features are traf-
fic statistics. Features are usually some statistics or attributes such as categorical
(Protocol, Color, etc.) or numerical (Flow duration, Size, etc.). When the fea-
tures are extracted, the feature engineering can be used. Some problems have
not enough features and then it is difficult to find a good model. The feature
engineering is about creating new features. A new feature can be created by
combining existing features with using various operations such as multiplication,
division, or even some ML model can provide new features. Sometimes data are
not complete. Some features may contain missing values or invalid values. These
values are not suitable for models and models are not able to handle that. If
data are large, it is possible to drop incorrect samples, but if data are small, it is
not possible. For example, missing values can be filled in with the most common
value of the feature, but it always depends on the feature. Now data are almost
prepared, but one more modification can be done. Some models prefer normal-
ized data than data with big intervals of numbers, that is why data are scaled
into specific small intervals. Usually standardization by standard deviation and
mean or min-max scaling are used.
In the final step of data preprocessing, the data are split to a training set
and test set. The training set is used for a model training and the test set is
used for a model evaluation. The test set must not be used for the training,
because it would learn correct answers and the evaluation would not provide
a valid result of how well model is able to predict unseen data. Most of the
models have many hyperparameters that can affect the result of training. Tuning
these hyperparameters is done on a validation set. The validation set is taken
from the training set and the rest of the training set is used for the model training
with specific hyperparameters. After finding the best hyperparameters the model
is trained on the whole training set and tested on the test set. These basic steps
can be followed in most of the ML problems.
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2.2.2 Loss Functions and Regularization
There are many loss functions and each of them is suitable for different ML
tasks and different models. The loss function is very important because it defines
the objective of what the model should learn. The model training is basically
optimizing one of the loss functions. The loss functions measure how many and
how big mistakes the model makes. The model that does not make any mistakes
in the training has the loss function equal to 0. The optimization problem is the
minimization of the loss function. However, some loss functions together with
some models may be very complex and a finding of global minimum may be
very difficult. Usually, the optimization problem ends in some appropriate local
minimum. For each ML task, there are different loss functions. Regression has
its own specific loss functions and also classification has its own loss functions.
Let us define only the classification loss functions.
The classification loss functions work with classes and probability distribu-
tions. This is the reason why it is not appropriate to use a regression loss function
for a classification problem. One of the loss functions is Cross-Entropy loss. The







where yi,c is the indicator if i-th sample belongs to class c and ŷi,c is predicted




yilog(ŷi) + (1 − yi)log(1 − ŷi)
The advantage of this loss function is that it much more penalizes the predictions,
that are far from the true class, and less penalizes the predictions that are close
to the true class. If the model predicts 0.8 and the true class is 1, then it already
says that the class is 1 and it does not need to be penalized a lot. In comparison
with only subtracting the true class and predicted class (Mean Absolute Error)
the Cross-Entropy gives error 0.097 and the subtracting gives 0.2.
Another loss function is Hinge loss. Hinge loss is related with Support Vector




max(0, 1 − ŷiyi)
where yi ∈ {−1, 1} is a true class and ŷi ∈ R is a predicted value. There is no
probability distribution. If the value is negative, then it is a negative class. If the
value is positive, then it is a positive class. To get zero loss, the values ŷi and yi
have to have the same sign and their product has to be greater than 1.
Next loss function is Exponential loss. Exponential loss is used, for example,





If the values ŷi and yi have the same sign, then the loss is low. If the values
have a different sign, then the loss grows very quickly. There are also other loss
functions, but let us now move on to regularization.
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The regularization is a technique on how to control the model complexity
and avoid the overfitting. The ML models may have many various parameters.
Sometimes it is appropriate to keep these parameters simple. For this purpose,
there are methods that modify loss functions and add a penalization for the model
complexity. One of the methods is L1 regularization. Let θ = {w1, w2, ..., wn} be
a set of model parameters and wi ∈ R be a parameter. Then the L1 regularization
can be defined as:




where L is one of the loss functions and λ is the weight of penalization for the
model complexity. The L1 regularization generally keeps the model parameters
close to 0. It is used, for example, in Logistic Regression. The L1 regularization
together with Logistic Regression can be used for extracting a feature importance.
In Logistic Regression, the number of parameters corresponds to the number of
features. The L1 regularization shrinks the coefficients of less important features
to 0. The features with a coefficient equal or close to zero are unimportant. The
higher the coefficient is, the more important the feature is.
Another regularization technique is L2 regularization. Instead of using the
absolute value, it uses square. The L2 regularization is defined as:




This regularization technique is a little bit different. The parameters less than
one does not give a big complexity, but the complexity grows very quickly with
parameters greater than one. The L2 regularization does not help to shrink the
parameters close to zero but helps to keep the parameters very small.
2.2.3 Metrics
After training a model, it needs to be decided how well the model performs on
the task. There can be many different metrics. It always depends on what is
important for the task. In Figure 2.1 is the Confusion Matrix, which describes
how many values are correctly predicted and how many values are miss classified.
There are four values TN , FN , TP and FP . The value TN means True Negative.
A model predicts 0/False and the actual value is 0/False. The value FN means
False Negative. A model predicts 0/False, but it is 1/True. The value TP , called
True Positive, is similar. A model predicts positive and it is positive. And the
last value FP , called False Positive, means predicting positive, but the actual
value is negative.
Each task may require a different performance. For example the intrusion
detection task requires to detect all intrusions, because not detecting an intrusion
may cause a damage to services or loosing private data. It is even better to
predict some intrusion if it is benign than the opposite – benign but actually, it
is some intrusion. On the other hand, there are also tasks, that require precision
than predicting more True even if it is incorrect. In some tasks predicting True
could mean making some expensive procedure. That is why model performance
is measured by different metrics.
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Figure 2.1: Binary Confusion Matrix
Metrics can be described on the Confusion Matrix (see Figure 2.1). Let us




It measures how well a model recognizes positive samples. In intrusion detection,
it would be appropriate to get Recall = 1, because recognizing all intrusions is
very important. The second metric is Precision:
Precision = TP
TP + FP
It measures how precise predictions are. It is useful when predicting negative
samples as positive is not suitable and also it is used for defining next metric.
The metric is F1 Score:
F1 Score = 2Precision × RecallPrecision + Recall
It takes into account both Recall and Precision, so it gives more information
about how well a model performs. The last metric is Accuracy:
Accuracy = TP + TP
TP + FP + TN + FN
Accuracy also gives global information about how well a model performs, but it is
not very suitable for unbalanced classes. If one class has much more samples than
other class and the model correctly classify only the major class, then Accuracy
is high, but the model is not able to recognize the minor class. In this case, F1
Score is better than Accuracy.
The intrusion detection dataset is very unbalanced. F1 Score may be very
useful in balancing Recall and Precision and to get global information about
model performance.
2.2.4 Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression is a linear model. It is a simple model for binary classification,
but it can be used also for multiclass classification. The prediction works in two
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steps. First, similar as in Linear Regression, the linear combination is computed
wT x, where x ∈ Rn is a n dimensional input column vector and wT ∈ Rn is
a n dimensional row vector of parameters that are optimized during a training.
This step is enough for regression tasks, but for classification tasks one more
transformation has to be applied. The transformation is called logistic function
or also known as sigmoid or softmax function. The function gives a probability
distribution of how probable is that the sample x is positive. The final Logistic
Regression hypothesis is defined as:
P (y = 1|x) = h(x) = e
wT x
1 + ewT x
To find optimal parameters a loss function has to be defined.
Requirements for loss functions are to give bigger error if the prediction is
incorrect and smaller error if the prediction is almost correct or correct. However,
the hypothesis h produces a probability distribution and describes data likelihood,
so it is not possible to only subtract a predicted class from a true class. The loss
function comes from the computing data likelihood. Let data be identically and
independently distributed, then data likelihood is defined as:




P (yi = 1|xi, h) = h(xi)
P (yi = 0|xi, h) = 1 − h(xi)
where Y and X are training labels and training data and h is a hypothesis. This
raw calculation has several disadvantages and is not very appropriate to be used
in this form. That is why logarithm is applied. Now the equation is easier:




This form of equation describes only data likelihood, but does not say anything
about what labels hypothesis should predict. One more modification needs to be




⎧⎨⎩log(h(xi)), if yi = 11 − log(h(xi)), if yi = 0
The created loss function above is well known Cross-Entropy loss[24].
Unfortunately, the training of Logistic Regression is not simple as the training
of Linear Regression. Parameters have to be optimized to produce the smallest
possible error. Optimization problem is defined as:
minw − log(L(X))
It can be optimized by one of the gradient descent algorithms, which is able to
find a local optimum.
Advantages of Logistic regression are that it is simple, fast and easy to in-
terpret. In intrusion detection, it would be better to have a fast model, because
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a network communication is fast too and many services and users communicate
on a network. On the other hand, Logistic Regression is simple and capable of
only discovering linear dependencies. It is not bad if there are not more complex
dependencies than linear dependencies. Logistic Regression may have one more
usage. It multiplies each feature with its weight and the weight can be interpreted
as the importance of the feature. Weights are real numbers, but if absolute value
of the weight is taken, then the bigger the weight is, the more important the
feature is. The training may produce really big weights and it would not help to
discover the most important features, but weights can be regulate. As mentioned
before, the L1 regularization technique helps to keep weights of less important
features close to 0. Logistic Regression with the L1 regularization can be trained
for each type of intrusion and then weights may provide a characterization of
each type of intrusion. Weights may suggest to completely remove some features,
because they may be unimportant. Also they may help human experts with what
they should looking for in an investigation of some intrusion.
This model might not provide very good results, but can be very helpful during
exploring the data and deciding what to do next.
2.2.5 Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine[25] (SVM) is a non-linear model. It is based on a linear
model, but with two small improvements. The improvements are very important.
Because of them SVM can separate even not linear separable problems. A linear
separable problem is a problem, where it is possible to separate two classes with
one hyperplane. One example of the linear separable problem can be two not
overlapping gaussians with different mean and not very big variance. In this
example, it is possible to create one hyperplane between them and separate these
two clusters. Unfortunately, there are not only linear separable problems, but
also other more difficult problems, so let us review SVM’s improvements.
(a) Possible separating hyperplanes. (b) The optimal separating hyperplane.
Figure 2.2: Example of possible separating hyperplanes and the optimal separat-
ing hyperplane[26].
The first improvement is related to finding the best separating hyperplane
and is contained in the name. In the example with two gaussians, the separating
hyperplane can be created in many ways. The hyperplane can have many different
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orientations and positions and still it can separate two classes very well (see Figure
2.2a). The question is which separating hyperplane is optimal and how to find it.
The optimal separating hyperplane would be the hyperplane, which is far from the
two classes, somewhere in the middle between them. This is done by introducing
so called support vectors. Support vectors define the margin of the separating
hyperplane and SVM tries to find the maximal appropriate margin (see Figure
2.2b). Support vectors are samples from the training data that influence the
position and orientation of the hyperplane. However, introducing only support
vectors would not help in separating not linear separable problems or noisy data,
that is why slack variables are introduced. Slack variables allow to some amount
of samples be in the margin of hyperplane or even to be missclassified (see Figure
2.3). It brings more variability in finding the optimal hyperplane.
Support vectors and slack variables are hidden in the final hypothesis. In
comparison with Logistic Regression, SVM does not provide a probability distri-
bution, but only {−1, 1} predictions. The hypothesis is defined as:
h(x) = sign(xT β + β0)
where β and β0 are parameters optimized during training. The training is again
an optimization problem. The idea is to maximize width of margin M .
maxβ,β0,∥β∥=1M
subject to yi(xTi β + β0) ≥ M, i = 1, ..., n
By adding slack variables ξi and using relation between β and M the optimization
problem can be written as:
minβ,β0
1





subject to ξi ≥ 0, yi(xTi β + β0) ≥ 1 − ξi, i = 1, ..., n
where parameter C gives importance for slack variables. For example, a linear
separable problem would have C = ∞. In next steps, the optimization problem
is transformed into the Lagrangian dual objective function and becomes a convex
quadratic programming problem.
This was only the first improvement, which helps with finding the optimal
separating hyperplane, but does not help with separating a not linear separable
problem. The second improvement is Kernel trick. The idea is if it is not able to
separate two classes in the original space, then transforming samples into more
dimensional space may help with their separation. However, the transformation
may be slow and expensive and it is used only for scalar product. It would be
great to have a function that does not need to do a transformation first, but can
compute scalar product and then apply the transformation. Kernel trick is all
about using such functions called Kernel functions. The formal definition is:
K(x, y) = ⟨f(x), f(y)⟩
where K is a Kernel function and f is a function, that transforms input from
original space into more dimensional space. Some of the Kernel functions are dth-
Degree polynomial, Radial basis and sigmoid. Kernel trick has to be added into
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Figure 2.3: Example of SVM and its slack variables for a not linear separable
problem.
the final optimization problem to train SVM with some Kernel function. SVM
without Kernel trick is a linear model, but with using Kernel trick it becomes
a non-linear model.
SVM model may help with more difficult intrusion detection, where Logistic
Regression is too simple for that. Some intrusions may have more complex de-
pendencies than linear dependencies. SVM can use one of the Kernel functions
and discover it. On the other hand, the intrusion detection dataset is not small
and, as mentioned, the training is not easy. The bigger the dataset is, the slower
the training is. The training complexity is between O(n2) and O(n3), where n is
size of the dataset. It depends on what method it uses for the training. In case
of intrusion detection dataset, it may be a problem, because size of the dataset is
16 232 943 samples and 80 features. It may take too much time for the training
and also the prediction may be slow. With growing dataset it can be solved by
selecting only part of the data for the training, but it may loose some informa-
tion. Again SVM can be trained for each type of intrusion. In comparison with
Logistic Regression, it may be better, but also it may be impossible to train.
2.2.6 Decision Tree
Decision Tree is completely different model than previous mentioned models. Pre-
vious models try to find the optimal separating hyperplane, but Decision Tree
prefers to create rectangles. It splits the whole feature space into several rectan-
gular regions and in each region it predicts one specific value. In a classification
problem, it predicts one class or probability distribution of classes. In a regression
problem, it predicts one real value. The model is a simple binary tree, where in
each node is one decision rule, that splits data to two parts (see Figure 2.4). Let
x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) be a sample. Then the splitting rule[27] is defined as:
R1(j, s) = {x|xj ≤ s} and R2(j, s) = {x|xj > s}
where s ∈ R is a suitable constant. Predictions are in leafs. In classification, it
predicts the most frequent class or creates the probability distribution of classes.
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In regression, it predicts the mean of values. Intrusion detection is a classification
problem, that is why it is only focused on classification here.
Figure 2.4: Tree Structure.
The training of Decision Tree for classification is again optimization of loss
function as in Logistic Regression. The most used loss functions for Decision
Tree are Gini Index and Cross-Entropy. First of all, let us defined the probability
prediction in a node. Let R be a region represented by the node and N be
a number of samples belonging into the region R. Then the probability of class


















Now the growing of a tree is simple. In each node, it goes over all available features
and tries all possible splitting points. For each splitting point, it computes the
loss function and remembers only the splitting point that best minimizes the loss
function. At the end, it selects the splitting point that best minimizes the loss
function. Then the growing continues in the left branch and the right branch
until a stop condition is met. The stop condition can be that the minimization is
very small and does not exceed some threshold, but it is not very useful. Usually,
a large tree is grown and then pruning techniques are applied. The disadvantage
of a large tree is, that it may overfit, but a small tree may underfit, that is why
tuning of the size is tested on a validation set.
Decision Tree is very a simple model, but main advantage is that it is human-
readable. For example, human experts could see how the model classifies some
intrusion. It is possible to see what features and how exactly they are used in the
decision. Also tree can be used for creating rules. Decision Tree is simpler than




There are many methods how to create rules for classification. This work uses
the method described by Jerome H. Friedman and Bogdan E. Popescu[28][29].
Their method extracts rules from Decision Tree ensembles. The Decision Tree
can be seen as a set of rules. Each path from the root of the tree to some leaf
is a rule and also each path from the root to some node is a rule. These rules
can be easily extracted from the tree and transformed into a logical formula with
conjunctions. To get short and diverse rules, the method uses Decision Tree
ensembles. Ensemble methods create a big number of small trees. It usually
creates tens or hundreds of trees. Each tree is trained on different subset of
the training set, so each tree may be completely different. The tree’s height is
controlled by the parameter. This is very useful, because it is possible to control
the maximal length of rules.
Let us defined the rule. Let x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) be a sample and si = (a, b⟩ be





and r(x) ∈ {0, 1}. Rules are capable of binary classification only. The rule may
not contain si for each feature i. The features not specified by si can have any
value. Now let M be a number of trees and tm be a number of leafs in m-th tree,





The number of rules grows quickly with the increasing number of trees, but not
every rule is useful. Duplicates and not very accurate rules have to be removed.
Skope-Rules[30], which is Python library implementing [28] and [29], uses Out-
of-Bag error to select appropriate rules. After selecting the appropriate rules,
there is one more postprocessing. The postprocessing goes over all selected rules
and removes all rules, that have smaller precision or smaller recall than some
threshold. The threshold of minimal precision and minimal recall can be passed
as a parameter.
The advantage of this method is that it is based on existing fast algorithms.
There are many good algorithms for creating ensembles also there are many
algorithms for training Decision Trees. The Decision Tree and ensemble methods
perform well, so it may provide good rules.
In the intrusion detection problem, it may bring good results. Decision Trees
may provide many different rules and by defining the maximal height of trees it
is possible to control the length of rules. It also provides the possibility to tune
precision and recall of rules.
2.3 Unsupervised Learning
As mentioned, the unsupervised learning[31] operates with unlabeled data. It
does not search for any optimal hypothesis. It tries to find similarities and rela-
tions in the data. One of the unsupervised learning methods is clustering. The
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clustering groups similar samples into one cluster. The similarity is usually de-
fined as Euclidean distance. The clusters can be used for detecting possible classes
or some model training. Other unsupervised learning method is dimensionality
reduction. The dimensionality reduction is useful in reducing data complexity. It
transforms data samples from high dimensional space into low dimensional space,
but it tries to preserve similarities and relations as much as possible. The unsu-
pervised learning is used for the data visualization, so let us now discuss some
methods for dimensionality reduction.
2.3.1 Principal Component Analysis
Principal Component Analysis[32][24] (PCA) is a transformation that tries to
maximize the data variance. The data are projected into so called principal
components. The principal components are sets of data projections with several
properties[31]. The first property is that principal components are ordered by
variance. The first principal component has the biggest variance and the last
principal component has the lowest variance. The second property is that they
are mutually uncorrelated. The PCA transformation has simple formula. Let
X ∈ Rm×n be data samples, where samples are column vectors, and W ∈ Rm×k
be a transformation matrix. Number n defines a number of samples and numbers
m and k define a number of dimensions of the original space and new space. The
number k is usually a much lower than m. The transformation is defined as:
Y = W T X
where Y ∈ Rk×n are data projections. The values of column vectors in Y are
linear combinations of the original features, so the original features are not lost
but hidden in the values of the column vectors. The problem is to find the optimal
transformation matrix W .
As mentioned in the beginning, PCA tries to maximize the data variance, so
the finding of principal components can be defined as:
maxW V ar(Y )
The computing of V ar(Y ) is nothing more than product of W and covariance
matrix Cov(X):
V ar(Y ) = V ar(W T X) = E[(W T X − E[W T X])2] = W T Cov(X)W
However, the matrix W can have very big values, so constraint ∥wi∥ = 1,
∀ i = 1, ..., m is added. The final result of the maximization problem for the
vector w1 is the eigen vector of the covariance matrix Cov(X) with the largest
eigen value. The second vector w2 is obtained in similar way, but the vector has
to be orthogonal to w1. It again gives the eigen vector, but the vector has the
second largest eigen value. The transformation matrix consists of m first eigen
vectors ordered by their eigen values. The last modification is centering the data
before their transformation:
Y = W T (X − µT 1)
where µ is the mean of the data X and 1 is a row vector of ones.
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In addition to the transformation, PCA can provide explained variance ra-
tio. The explained variance ratio is the ratio between the principal component
variance and the data variance. It says how well the data are described by the
principal components. The value 1 says that there is no difference between the
data and the principal components. The values closer to 0 says that the principal
components do not describe the data well. The ratio helps with choosing the
appropriate number of the principal components to not lose a lot of information
about the data.
2.3.2 Multidimensional Scaling
Multidimensional Scaling[31] (MDS) is different than PCA. It transforms the
data samples from the high dimensional space into low dimensional space, but it
tries to preserve the distances between the data samples. The distance is usually
measured as Euclidean distance dij = ∥xi −xj∥, where xi, xj are the data samples
and dij is the distance between them. MDS can be expressed as:
Y = W T X
where W , X and Y are the same as in PCA. Now there is only problem how to
find the transformation matrix W . PCA solves this as maximizing the variance
of the transformed data. However, MDS uses only the distances. It does not need
anything more. MDS defines the finding of optimal transformation matrix as the
minimizing the so called stress function:
minW S, where
S(y1, y2, ..., yn) =
∑
i=i′
(dii′ − ∥yi − yi′∥)2
This is know as Kruskal-Shephard stress function. It tries to preserve the pairwise
distances as well as possible. This is not the only variant of stress function.
Another stress function is Sammon stress function:
S(y1, y2, ..., yn) =
∑
i=i′
(dii′ − ∥yi − yi′∥)2
dii′
The Sammon stress function puts more emphasis on smaller pairwise distances.
Both functions can be optimized by a gradient descent algorithm. MDS may give
good result, but the problem is the number of pairwise distances. The number
of pairwise distances grows very quickly with the growing number of samples. It
grows quadratically, so it may be a problem for large data.
2.3.3 Locally Linear Embedding
Locally Linear Embedding[31] (LLE) is similar to MDS, but as the name suggests
it aims at the local distances. It tries to preserve the local structures. First, it
defines the sample neighbors. The sample neighbors are the closest samples mea-
sured by Euclidean distance. Neighboring can be solved by K-nearest neighbors
N(i), where N(i) are the neighbors of a sample xi. The number of neighbors is






where wik = 0 for k ̸∈ N(i) and
∑n
k=1 wik = 1. After finding the optimal wik, the








Each dimensionality reduction method may give different results. It does not
mean that one method works best for all data. It always depends on the data.
Let us now have a look on the last method that uses a probability distribution
for describing distances between the data.
2.3.4 t-Stochastic Neighbor Embedding
The method t-Stochastic Neighbor Embedding[33] (t-SNE) is improved variant
of Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (SNE). Instead of operating with Euclidean
distances, it uses a probability distribution that defines the similarity in the
data. The similarity measure is defined as the conditional probability pj|i. The
probability pj|i says how much it is probable that the sample xi has the sample
xj as its neighbor with respect to Gaussian distribution with center xi. However,
computing of Gaussian distribution for xi needs its variance σi. The variance σi
is computed by binary search algorithm and Perplexity given by user.
The probability distribution defines the similarity measure very well in high
dimensional space. The same has to be done in low dimensional space, but in low
dimensional space the variance σi is fixed to 1√2 . Let qj|i be a probability in low
dimensional space. It needs the similarities only between the xi and xj, where
i ̸= j, so the probabilities for i = j are defined as pi|j = 0 and qi|j = 0. There are
two probability distributions now. The first Pi describes the similarities in high
dimensional space and the second Qi describes the similarities in low dimensional
space. The objective is to get Qi similar to Pi as much as possible. If Qi is similar
to Pi, then the data in low dimensional space are similarly distributed as in high
dimensional space.
It is again an optimization problem, but it needs a function comparing two
probability distributions. One of the functions is Kullback-Leibler function that












The only thing now is to apply gradient descent algorithm to optimize the loss
L. However, this problem is difficult to optimize.
The method t-SNE improves these difficulties. One of the simplifications is
using of symmetric SNE. It defines new probabilities pij and qij, where pij = pji
and qij = qji ∀i, j. The probability qij is computed in the same way as in SNE




This simplifies the gradient of the loss L, so it is easier to optimize. The second
problem is so called Crowding Problem[34]. The problem is solved by replacing
the Gaussian distribution in low dimensional space with Student’s t-distribution
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with one degree of freedom. The benefit of Student’s t-distribution is its behavior
far from the center.
The method t-SNE works completely different than the previous methods, so




This chapter presents the process of the model training from the data preparation,
feature selection and choosing a model for the final training. Section 3.1 describes
the data preprocessing. It focuses on the data transformation, removing useless
features and how to deal with the large dataset on a personal computer. Section
3.2 presents the data visualization. Various techniques are tested and the best
result is attached in this section. Section 3.3 discusses the feature selection. The
dataset has 80 features and not every feature may be important. It is not neces-
sary to keep each feature in the dataset. The section discusses several methods
and compares their results. The chapter ends with Section 3.4 presenting results
of various models, their advantages and disadvantages in the intrusion detection
problem.
3.1 Data Preprocessing
The whole dataset is stored on Amazon Web Services (AWS). To download the
dataset, it requires to have AWS Commad Line Interface (CLI)1, that allows to
access AWS and manipulate with the data. As mentioned in the description of
the dataset (Chapter 1), the dataset contains more than the prepared data for
a model training. It contains also raw data. To download the whole dataset, run:
> aws s3 sync --no-sign-request --region your-region
"s3://cse-cic-ids2018/" dest-dir
where your-region is AWS region2 and dest-dir is a directory, where it should be
downloaded. However, the whole dataset has more than 400 GB. If the raw data
are not needed, it is unnecessary to download the whole dataset. For listing files
and directories on AWS, run:
> aws s3 ls --no-sign-request --region your-region
"s3://cse-cic-ids2018/" --recursive --human-readable --summarize
Based on results of above command, it is possible to download only specific part
of the dataset. In our case, only CSV files are important:
> aws s3 cp --no-sign-request --region your-region
"s3://cse-cic-ids2018/Processed Traffic Data for ML Algorithms"
dest-dir --recursive
After downloading is completed, nine CSV files can be found in the directory
dest-dir. Each file represents one day of intrusion simulation. These files needs
to be put together into one big file.
If CSV files have the same header, it is easy to put them together into one big
file. However, one file has different header than the others and also the headers are
contained in the files more than once. The file recorded on Thuesday 20.02.2018
1AWS CLI documentation and download link can be found on https://aws.amazon.com/
cli/.
2AWS region list can be found on https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/
UserGuide/using-regions-availability-zones.html.
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has four more columns than the others. The columns are Flow ID, Src IP, Src
Port, Dst IP. These columns can be removed, because IP and Flow ID describe
communication in the specific network, but the model should be applicable in any
network. Also Src Port can be omitted. After this, all files have the same header.
Now the files can be put together. Headers that are contained in a middle of files
can be skipped.
One of the most used programming languages for machine learning is Python3.
Everything in this work is implemented in Python. Python has many libraries for
loading and manipulating with CSV files. One very often used library is Pandas4.
It allows to compute basic statistics, drop columns, join more files into one big
file and much more. Unfortunately, it is implemented for small data. The bigger
data are, the more difficult it is to use. Also every experiment is run on machine
with only 12 GB of RAM and 16 GB of Swap. Pandas consumes more than 12
GB of memory and the loading of the data is very slow. Other options are to use
PySpark5 or to create own data transformer. PySpark is very good tool for Big
Data, but it is more useful for distributed computing than for running on a single
machine. For running it on the single machine it is too heavy, so creating own
data transformer may be a better way.
There is a need to analyze data, transform the data and then visualize them.
The analysis should provide basic statistics such as minimum, maximum, mean,
standard deviation, number of unique values, number of distinct values, most
frequent values and number of values satisfying some condition. It must not load
all data into RAM. Each statistic is represented in Python by one class, which
extends the abstract class Analyzer. Each class is capable of analyzing row by
row and joining more results into one final result. The Analyzers are used in the
class AnalysisRunner, which is capable of running the whole analysis and storing
the results into CSV files. The class AnalysisRunner can be run in a single thread
or in multiple threads. It processes the data row by row. The whole analysis can
be configured by YAML6 file. The example of yaml configuration is:











Bwd Blk Rate Avg: *id001
Bwd Byts/b Avg: *id001
Bwd Header Len: *id001
Data transformations are implemented in the class Transformer. The class Trans-




6YAML specification and projects can be found on https://yaml.org/.
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value. It again processes the data row by row. The data visualization is done by
another Python library called Matplotlib[35]. Matplotlib7 is one of very popular
libraries for creating various type of graphs.
The first analysis is run to discover classes ratio and invalid or missing values.
Missing values are not found, but there are invalid values or values not usable
for machine learning. Features that contain invalid values are Flow Byts/s and
Flow Pkts/s. Invalid values are inf and nan. There are two options – replace
values by suitable value or remove incorrect samples. Here invalid values are
replaced by suitable values as Qianru Zhou and Dimitrios Pezaros did in their
work [6]. The value inf should refer to some very big number, that is why inf
is replaced by a maximum. The value nan is hard to say, what it should be. It
could be some incorrect division or just some issue during measurement. It can
be replaced by 0 or by a most frequent value. The value 0 would suggest, that
there were 0 somewhere in the computing the feature. On the other hand, it
may be completely different reason why nan is there. After all, the most frequent
value appears as the most suitable value, because it does not bring any strange
activity. The final replacements are:
• Flow Byts/s:
– inf is replaced by 1806642857.14286
– nan is replaced by 0
• Flow Pkts/s:
– inf is replaced by 6000000.0
– nan is replaced by 1000000
The second analysis computes basic statistics. First, it is computed for the
whole dataset and then for each class separately. The analysis discovers that some
features have only one distinct value and the others have a big range of values.
The features with only one distinct value are Bwd Blk Rate Avg, Bwd Byts/b,
Avg, Bwd PSH Flags, Bwd Pkts/b Avg, Bwd URG Flags, Fwd Blk Rate Avg, Fwd
Byts/b Avg, Fwd Pkts/b Avg. These features can be removed, because they does
not bring any useful information. Also Timestamp can be removed, because time
is included in statistics of flow such as minimum, maximum, mean and standard
deviation. Most of the other features have very large standard deviation that is
caused by the very big range of values. These big ranges of values may influence
the training and make it more difficult. It is better to normalize these features
by some normalization method before the model training.
Before normalizing the data, it has to be split to a training set and test set.
The training set consists of 80% data and the test set consists of 20% data. The
test set is left for the evaluation of the final model. The training set is then
divided on a smaller training set and validation set. The validation set consists
of 20% data from the training set and the rest is the smaller training set. Now
there is a question how to choose the data. The data can be chosen randomly
or in some order. The data are time series, so it is more appropriate to start
at beginning and stop at some point. The first 80% of the data is the training
7Documentation and examples can be found on https://matplotlib.org/.
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set and the rest is the test set, but the classes ratio is preserved in both sets.
Similarly it is done for the validation set. The data normalization is done after
removing useless features and splitting the data. The data are normalized in the
usual way by standardization.
The problem is still the size of the data. Some amount of RAM takes the
model and some models need to have the whole training set in RAM. After the
data normalization, values are small float number, but with high precision. The
precision can be decreased, so there will not be too long numbers. Next step
is to convert the data into numpy array. Numpy array uses less memory, but it
would be better to have in memory only the samples, that are required. This lazy
loading is allowed by numpy’s memory-map. Numpy array is stored as binary file
and only the rows or columns that are required are loaded into RAM.
3.2 Data Visualization
In addition to computing the statistics, box plots are created. Box plots display 6
values – minimum, maximum, first quartile, median, third quartile and outliers.
It is one of ways exploring the data distribution. Some of interesting box plots
are attached at the end of this work (see Attachment A.1). On box plots can be
seen many things. First of all, they explain why standard deviation is so large.
Some features have many large or small outliers, which make standard deviation
bigger. Standard deviation is related to skewness. They imply that some features
may have some skew probability distribution, because median of values is not in
the middle but is shifted to left or right. The last thing is that some classes differ
a lot and may be easily separated. Some features may appear as important in
the classification.
It is also possible to visualize samples of the dataset. However, samples have
many dimensions. After removing useless features, there is still 70 features. The
samples dimensions have to be reduced before visualizing. The data visualization
has to have samples with only 2 dimensions. It is possible to visualize samples
with 3 dimensions, but 2 dimensions are usually enough. There are many meth-
ods for the dimensionality reduction. Most of the methods are implemented in
machine learning library called Scikit-Learn[36]. The dimensionality reduction is
tested by 4 methods. Let us start with less successful methods.
The first is Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). MDS is a method, that tries to
preserve distances between the data points during the dimensionality reduction.
Preserving distances between the data points may provide good results, but the
method is not optimized for large data. The dataset is reduced on reasonable
size, that is still representative, but MDS is not able to finish its computing on
such data.
The second method is Locally Linear Embedding (LLC). This method does
not try to preserve distances between all data points but only between the data
point and its neighbors. The number of neighbors is a parameter, that can be
tuned to get some good result. It looks more promising than computing distances
between all data points. However, even LLC is not able to finish its computing.
One of newer methods is t-Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE). It works
differently than the previous methods. Instead of computing Euclidean distances,
it uses the probability as the measure of similarity. On well known examples it
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gives better results than other methods, but the computation is not very easy.
As expected, this method fails on such large data. The similar method is Uni-
form Manifold Approximation (UMAP), that should work better than t-SNE.
Unfortunately, UMAP is not able to give any result too.
(a) The graph visualizes all transformed
data.
(b) The graph is zoomed in the cluster area
to show the cluster details.
Figure 3.1: The graphs show the first two principal components of PCA. The x
axis represents the first principal component and the y axis represents the second
principal component. Only part of the data samples is transformed by PCA to
reduce the computation complexity.
The only method that works good is Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
PCA tries to maximize the data variance. The bigger variance, the more data
are spread in a space. The PCA computation is not difficult. It works with
the covariance matrix and its eigen vectors. It only finds the eigen vector with
the largest eigen value to create the first principal component. To create second
principal component it takes the eigen vector with the second largest eigen value
etc. Moreover in Scikit-Learn, they implemented incremental PCA, which allows
to work with batches and does not need the whole data in RAM. The result of
PCA can be seen in Figure 3.1a and 3.1b. The first graph demonstrates first
two principal components of the reduced data. Classes of the data points are
distinguished by color. It shows that some class is completely outside of the
cluster, but other classes are in one cluster. The second graph is focused only on
the cluster, but even zooming does not suggest any good separation of classes.
It means that the first two principal components may not be enough to describe
the data well or the data may be difficult to separate.
PCA does not provide only the transformed data points but also the explained
variance ratio for each principal component. The bigger explained variance ratio
is, the better data are described by the principal component. The explained
variance ratio can be seen in Figure 3.2. It reveals, that the first 30 components
are enough to describe the data well. For example, 31 components have ratio
0.983, so there is very small difference between the variance of 31 components
and the original data variance. This can be used to reduce dimensions of the
data and train the model on less features. The training is then faster and the
data are smaller. However, not every feature may be important for the model.
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There may be only few features important for the model and the dimensions of
the data may be reduced more than by PCA. Moreover, the principal components
are combinations of the original features. It is not very suitable for training short
and simple rules, where getting rules for original features is more appropriate.
However, for some model it might be good. Let us have a look on feature selection.
Figure 3.2: The graph shows the explained variance ratio. The explained variance
ratio reaches value 1.0 around the first 30 principal components. The first 30
principal components may be considered sufficient.
3.3 Feature Selection
Feature selection tries to find the most important features and select them for the
model training. Feature importance can be defined in various ways. For example,
the Decision Tree has different feature importance measure than the Logistic
Regression. Each model may consider different features as important, but if some
feature almost defines the class of samples, it should have high importance for
each model. Not every model is able to provide feature importance. In this work,
two models are used for feature importance – Logistic Regression and Decision
Tree. In the Logistic Regression, feature importance is extracted from its weights
w = (w1, w2, ..., wn) and in the Decision Tree feature importance is defined as
normalized total reduction of criteria by the feature. Feature importance may
help in discovering classes characterization. The feature importance is computed
for each class separately. For each class both models are trained and then feature
importance is extracted. Let us have a look on the Logistic Regression.
The Logistic Regression is trained on the training set without the validation
set. The dataset has 15 classes, so to get feature importance for each class it has
to be trained for each class. The problem is very unbalanced classes. For example,
SQL Injection has only tens of samples. It does not mean it is not enough, but it
may need a help with increasing its weight. Fortunately, the Logistic Regression
in Scikit-Learn allows to specify the weights of classes, also it provides a method
to compute their weights based on their occurrences. This persuades the model,
that both classes are equally important. After tuning the weights of classes, the
Logistic Regression is able to recognize most of the intrusions and the feature
importance can be extracted. The features are sorted by its importance and
only the names of the features are mentioned (see Attachment B.1). The results
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of Logistic Regression reveal, that only small part of the features is important.
With the feature selection, it may be possible to get less features than with the
dimensionality reduction, but it has to be tested by cross validation or other
validation method.
The Decision Tree is trained in the similar way as the Logistic Regression, but
the Decision Tree does not need to tune weights of classes a lot. It achieves better
results than the Logistic Regression. Again it is trained as a binary classifier, for
each class separately. However, the Decision Tree requires only a few features
to correctly classify the intrusions. The extracted feature importance can be
found in Attachment B.1. For some intrusions it considers only 1-3 features as
important. In comparison with the Logistic Regression, it is much more better.
Feature importance can be computed not only with ML models, but also
with statistical methods. One of the methods is Analysis of Variance known
as ANOVA. It has different forms. This work uses one-way ANOVA test. It
computes F-value and P-value for each feature and based on its values it is possible
to determine whether the feature is important or not. The advantage is that
feature importance is not tied with any specific model and is based only on
statistics. However, it has important assumptions that must be satisfied otherwise
it may not be so powerful. The results of ANOVA can be seen in Attachment
B.1. It provides similar results as the Decision Tree. Let us now summarize all
results.
Bot Intrusion
Botnet intrusion infects some amount of machines and then it requests screen-
shots every 400 seconds from them. The requesting screenshots should increase
amount of data sent to attacker. The most important features show, that many
features describe data flow in backward direction. The size of packets in back-
ward direction may be very important, because its standard deviation, mean and
maximum appear as important. In addition to the size of packets in backward di-
rection, there are other features describing the size of packets. All the important
features may be characteristics of Botnet Intrusion.
Brute Force -Web and -XSS
In Brute Force -Web intrusion, the methods consider important the features de-
scribing the size of packets in backward direction. However, there is not any
feature appearing in every method. The Logistic Regression and ANOVA have
similar the most important features, but the Decision Tree has completely differ-
ent the most important features. Brute Force -XSS looks similar as Brute Force
-Web, but Brute Force -XSS has one more different the most important feature.
The feature is the size of packets in forward direction. It is considered by the
Logistic Regression and ANOVA.
DDOS Intrusions
DDOS intrusions are based on overwhelming or flooding some machine. It also
appears in the feature importance. All three methods agree on features, that
describe sent data in forward direction. Only DDOS attack-LOIC-HTTP has
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different the most important features. In DDOS attack-LOIC-HTTP is the most
important backward direction. The feature describing number of bytes sent in
initial window in the forward direction is probably the most important feature
of DDOS attack-HOIC. The feature appears in all three methods and ANOVA
even considers it as the only important feature. Also the Decision Tree consid-
ers only two features as important. The feature describing number of packets
with at least 1 byte of TCP data payload in the forward direction is probably
the most important feature of DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP. It again appears in all
three methods and the Decision Tree considers it as the only important feature.
The common most important feature in DDOS attack-LOIC-HTTP is standard
deviation of the size of packets in backward direction.
DOS Intrusions
DOS intrusions are similar to DDOS, but are led by a single machine, so this may
make some difference. In each DOS intrusion, all three methods consider some
feature as the most important feature. However, DOS intrusions do not differ
from DDOS intrusions very much in the most important features. Some of DOS
intrusions are more characterized by data flow in backward direction, but also
some of them are more characterized by data flow in forward direction. However,
there can be found some important features that are not considered in DDOS
intrusions.
FTP and SSH Brute Force
All three methods does not consider many features as important in FTP Brute
Force intrusion, but also they does not agree on the same features. The most
promising features may be the features describing number of backward packets
per second and minimum segment size observed in the forward direction. In SSH
Brute Force intrusion, it is more difficult. The Decision Tree prefers features
about header, but these features do not appear in ANOVA and the Logistic
Regression. They rather prefer features describing number of packets with URG
and minimum segment size observed in the forward direction.
SQL Injection and Infiltration
SQL Injection and Infiltration are difficult to recognize. It is demonstrated by
how many features the methods consider as important and still the models are
not able to recognize all SQL Injections and Infiltration. However, in comparison
with how these intrusions behave and what they do it is difficult to detect. For
example, it is usual to run some SQL statements behind the web page and then
return their results. The features do not contain any specific information about
SQL statements, so they may not have enough information or the information
that would be more useful.
3.4 Training
The main purpose of a model training is to discover dependencies in the data and
to have some baseline for a comparison with rules. In the training stage, several
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models are trained to discover various dependencies and to find the best fitting
model. It starts from a simple model to a more complex model.
First, the Logistic Regression is tested. It is used for both feature importance
and linear dependencies testing. For each intrusion, one Logistic Regression is
trained. Here it is used as a binary classifier, but there are methods how to put
binary classifiers together and create the multiclass classifier. The methods are
for example One-vs-All or One-vs-One. As mentioned in the previous section,
the Logistic Regression has a problem with unbalanced classes. However, it can
be solved by balancing the weight of classes. Unfortunately, even this does not
help to get results as Qianru Zhou and Dimitrios Pezaros[6] achieved. It does not
mean that there are not any linear dependencies, but there are probably some
more complex dependencies. Sometimes the Logistic Regression works better for
the logarithm of the data. The data are also normalized by the logarithm, but
the Logistic Regression performs worse than for the data normalized by stan-
dardization. The Logistic Regression achieves in the binary classification Recall
closed to 1.0 in all intrusions except SQL Injection and Infiltration. It is not a big
problem to persuade the Logistic Regression to detect a specific intrusion, but
the problem is F1 Score. In most intrusions it has a big amount of FN and FP .
The results for binary classification are attached in Attachment B.2. The Logistic
Regression is too simple model for classifying such problem. It can be also seen
in Figure 3.3, that demonstrates the performance of multiclass classification. The
best and usable results are for DDOS attack-HOIC, DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP,
DoS attacks-Hulk and FTP-BruteForce. However, more complex models should
have better results.
Figure 3.3: Confusion matrix for multiclass Logistic Regression (One-vs-All).
One of more complex models is Random Forest. It is basically an ensemble
of the Decision Trees. It is used also by Qianru Zhou and Dimitrios Pezaros[6].
In their work, it achieves better results than the Logistic Regression. In this
work, it is used differently. Instead of using it as a binary classifier it is used as
a multiclass classifier. In comparison with results in [6], it achieves very similar
results, but takes much more time for training than the Logistic Regression. The
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worst classified intrusions are Brute Force -XSS, DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTest,
Infiltration and SQL Injection. Based on confusion matrix in Figure 3.4, there
may be some similarities between intrusions. For example, Brute Force -XSS and
Infiltration may be very similar to Benign, because most of the positive samples
are classified as Benign. Also SQL Injection may be similar to Benign, but not
too significantly. One more interesting similarity may be between DoS attacks-
SlowHTTPTest and FTP-BruteForce. This similarity may be also demonstrated
by their feature importance (see Attachment B.1). They have similar the most
important features. On one hand, the training of the Random Forest is slow, but
on the other hand the classification is fast and more accurate than the classifica-
tion by the Logistic Regression. The Random Forest may be a good candidate
for an intrusion detection system.
Figure 3.4: Confusion matrix for multiclass Random Forest with 200 trees.
The Random Forest has problems to classify some intrusions, but other model
might be better. SVM is next model, that is more complex than the Logistic
Regression. It has advantage that it can use different kernels and it may discover
other dependencies. Unfortunately, the disadvantage is very slow training and
very big consumption of memory. The dataset has to be very drastically reduced
to be able to train SVM. First, only 1 000 000 samples from Benign samples is
selected and then it is more reduced by selecting less than 1 000 000 samples, but
with preserving the classes ratio except Benign class. Some information might be
lost by selecting only part of the data, but still it may be representative enough.
The SVM is trained with two different kernels – Polynomial with degree of 3 and
RBF. The best results for multiclass classification are presented in Figure 3.5.
The multiclass classifier is created by One-vs-All method. In comparison with the
Logistic Regression, F1 Score and Recall is higher than for the Logistic Regression,
but it is able to detect only few intrusions and others are classified as Benign. It
might be caused by very unbalanced classes or the kernels may not be suitable
for such problem. In comparison with the Random Forest the SVM is worse.
However, the Random forest has difficulties to detect Brute Force -XSS, DoS
attacks-SlowHTTPTest, Infiltration and SQL Injection. The SVM can discover
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if there are more complex dependencies. The results of the SVM as a binary
classifier are attached in Attachment B.3 and B.4. The best results for Brute Force
-XSS and Infiltration are achieved with Polynomial kernel and for DoS attacks-
SlowHTTPTest and SQL Injection are achieved with RBF kernel. In comparison
with the Random Forest, the SVM does not provide better results except DoS
attacks-SlowHTTPTest. However, the SVM is used as a binary classifier and the
Random Forest as a multiclass classifier, so in general the SVM is worse than the
Random Forest (see Figure 3.4 and 3.5). On the other hand, SVM discovers that
RBF kernel may deal with some intrusions better.
Figure 3.5: Confusion matrix for multiclass SVM with RBF kernel (One-vs-All).
The SVM is trained on small part of the data with size 827 651 samples. The
small part of the data tries to preserve classes ratio as much as possible with
respect to a minimal number of samples for one class and except Benign class.
Unbalanced classes can be overcome by a boosting method. The boosting
method is in a family of ensembles. It uses weak learners. The weak learner
is a classifier, that is better than a random guess, but usually not very much.
The training is iterative. Every next weak learner tries to correct the previous
weak learner. Here is used AdaBoost (Adaptive Boosting). AdaBoost increases
importance of wrongly classified samples, that pushes the weak learner to focus
on these samples. As a weak learner is usually used the Decision Tree with the
limited height. However, AdaBoost does not perform well. The result is presented
in Figure 3.6.
The last trained model is Decision Tree. It is used as a binary classifier and
trained for each intrusion. The training is fast, but needs balancing of classes
by providing their weights. The Decision Tree achieves the best results among
mentioned models (see Attachment B.2). It also achieves the best result in the
multiclass classification. The result is presented in Figure 3.7. In comparison with
the Random Forest, the performance significantly differs in detecting Brute Force
-XSS, DDoS attack-LOIC-UDP, DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTest, FTP-BruteForce,
Infiltration and SQL Injection. The Random Forest is better in detecting DDoS
attack-LOIC-UDP, FTP-BruteForce, Infiltration and SQL Injection, but in gen-
eral the Decision Tree is better. First of all, the most important features are
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Figure 3.6: Confusion matrix for AdaBoost with 400 stumps (very small Decision
Trees).
extracted. Then the most important features are selected by 5-fold cross valida-
tion. The cross validation is run for the training data with all features and for
the training data with the most important features. The results of both cross
validations are compared by t-test whether they significantly differ. The differ-
ences in cross validation results are not significant. For all intrusions only the
most important features can be used. The list of the most important features
and the features, that are selected for the final training, are in Attachment B.1
in the column for the Decision Tree. The same most important features may be
used for creating rules, because the Decision Tree can be considered as a set of
rules.
Figure 3.7: Confusion matrix for multiclass Decision Tree (One-vs-All). The
Decision Trees are trained on the most important features only.
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4. Rules Creation
This chapter discusses creating simple and short rules for each intrusion in the
dataset. Section 4.1 starts with describing options of library for creating rules
and continues with the rules training and presenting the final rules. The rules
training is discussed for each intrusion separately. The last section is Section 4.2.
It compares results of the final rules with the Decision Tree results. Let us now
dive into the rules training.
4.1 Training
As mentioned before, rules can be created in many ways. In this work, they
are created by method that is proposed by Jerome H. Friedman and Bogdan E.
Popescu[28][29] and implemented in Python library called Skope-Rules[30]. Rules
are extracted from an ensemble of Decision Trees. The Decision Trees perform
very well on the intrusion detection problem, so creating rules should not be very
difficult, but simple and short rules may not exist or may not perform well. Also
it would be great to use only the most important features to not have too complex
rules. The feature importance is referred in the previous chapter. The Decision
Tree provides feature importance too. Since the Decision Tree can be seen as
a set of rules, its feature importance should be the most appropriate. However,
rules might need more features than the Decision Tree or might consider different
features as important.
Library Skope-Rules provides many parameters how to tune creating rules.
Parameters, that are used here, are n estimators, max depth, precision min and
recall min. First, the parameter n estimators defines how many estimators (Deci-
sion Trees) should be used in the ensemble. The parameter max depth defines the
maximum depth of the Decision Tree. This parameter can be used for regulating
the maximum length of rules. The last parameters precision min and recall min
are used in stage of selecting final rules. They define what minimal performance
rules have to have to be selected. The objective is to have only few rules with
low max depth and high precision min and recall min.
The rules are created in the same way for each class. The rules should be short
and the set of rules should be small. That is why each training starts with the pa-
rameter max depth set to 2 and the parameter n estimators set to 30. A higher
number of estimators may provide more various rules. The parameters preci-
sion min and recall min are tuned for each value of the parameter max depth. If
the parameters precision min and recall min are high, then less rules are created.
There are usually rules with low Precision and Recall and setting the parameters
precision min and recall min to higher value than 0.5 does not create any rules.
The parameter max depth is tested for values from the interval ⟨2, 10⟩. The rules
longer than 10 are considered as too long. The training is very sensitive to setting
the parameters. A small change in the parameter max depth or in the parameters
precision min and recall min makes big difference in results. Many longer rules
usually perform worse than short rules. At the end of the training, the values of
the rules are returned back to their original values without standardization. The
original values may provide more information to human experts than the values
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after standardization.
The features for the training are selected based on the Decision Tree. The
Decision Tree provides the feature importance for each class (see Attachment
B.1). The training uses the most important features, that are provided by the
Decision Tree. However, sometimes the rules need more features for the training
than the Decision Tree. The features, that are provided by the Decision Tree
and selected for the training, are listed in Attachment C.1. More features means
longer or more rules, so it is not appropriate to use too many features. If the rules
do not perform well, the number of features is increased by 1. The increasing
continues until it achieves similar results as the Decision Tree or it contains too
many features. On the other hand, in most cases the final rules use less features
than the training. The features of the final rules are presented in Attachment
C.1 and the performance of the rules is presented in Attachment C.17. All final
rules are listed in Attachment C.2. Let us go through each class.
Class Benign represents usual activity without any intrusion. It is not very
important for rules, because rules separate only specific intrusion from the other
intrusions and from usual activity. If it is not any intrusion, it should do nothing.
It means if any rule is not met, it is usual activity (Benign class). On the other
hand, it can be seen as if it is not usual activity, it is probably an intrusion.
However, classifying Benign class may be more difficult than classifying only
specific intrusion. The training of rules uses 25 the most important features, that
are extracted from the Decision Tree. Experiments demonstrate that shorter rules
have better generalization than longer rules. The parameter max depth provides
best results with value 3. Higher values provide the same number of rules but
longer rules. However, the rules have lower recall and precision. The set of rules
is tested on the test set. The final set of rules has only 2 rules and uses only
3 features. It is presented in Table 4.1. The results in Attachment C.17 show
that separating Benign class is not easy for the rules. On the one hand, only
4.7% of intrusions is classified as Benign class, so it is not bad result for intrusion
detection. On the other hand, 25% of Benign class is classified as an intrusion,
so it may not be appropriate to have too many false negative and to be notified
about an intrusion every fourth Benign sample. Classifying only one specific
intrusion should be easier and rules should be more accurate. Let us have a look
on specific intrusions.
Benign
1. Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 25742.5261
∧ Dst Port ≤ 18521.5103
∧ Subflow Fwd Byts > 66699.3250
2. Dst Port > 19464.6142
∧ Subflow Fwd Byts ≤ 66699.3250
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.75, F1 Score = 0.85
Table 4.1: Set of rules for class Benign.
The first intrusion is class Bot. The training of rules uses only 2 the most
important features. This number of features should not need very long rules.
Rectangular area in 2 dimensional space can be defined by 4 points only, so the
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appropriate maximum length of rules should be 4. The final set of rules has only
2 rules with length of 3 (see Table 4.2). The rules use only conjunction, but with
using disjunction the set of rules can be transformed into one rule. The area,
that is defined by the feature Dst Port, is same in both rules. Only area, that is
defined by the feature Bwd Pkt Len Mean, differs. The class Bot can be classified
with only one simple rule and at the same time classification can achieve Recall
0.97 and F1 Score 0.99.
Bot
1. Bwd Pkt Len Mean ≤ 85.4608
∧ Dst Port ≤ 18528.3875
∧ Dst Port > 18527.4706
2. Bwd Pkt Len Mean > 85.4842
∧ Dst Port ≤ 18528.3875
∧ Dst Port > 18527.4706
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.97, F1 Score = 0.99
Table 4.2: Set of rules for class Bot.
Unfortunately, not every class can be distinguished as the previous one. Class
Brute Force -Web is not very good separable with a set of rules even with the
higher number of longer rules. The rules are trained on 9 the most important
features. In comparison with the previous class the parameter max depth has to
be set to 7 to get reasonable results. The higher values of max depth have worse
results. Moreover, the objective is to create simple and short rules. Longer rules
can be extracted directly from the Decision Tree and it does not need a special
method for creating rules. Class Brute Force -Web does not contain many samples
and it causes a problem in the training. Unfortunately, Skope-Rules does not
allow to specify weights of classes, so it has to be solved in a different way. It can
be solved in two ways – up-sample a minority class or down-sample a majority
class. Here the unbalanced classes are solved by up-sampling the minority class.
However, creating rules for this class is not very successful. It creates 5 rules and
each has minimum length of 5 and maximum length of 6. Because the rules are
too long, they are attached in Attachment C.8. Even with such rules it achieves
on the test set Recall 0.57 and F1 Score 0.55 only. On the other hand, this
intrusion may not be easy to detect.
Similar class is Brute Force -XSS. Both classes represent web attacks. Class
Brute Force -XSS has the same problem. It does not contain many samples.
It has approximately the same number of samples like the previous class. The
unbalanced classes are solved by up-sampling the minority class. The training
uses 20 the most important features and the parameter max depth is set to 10.
Shorter rules do not perform well. The final set of rules is more successful than
the previous one, but it contains longer rules. The training creates 5 rules, where
each rule has minimum length of 4 and maximum length of 9. The rules are
attached in Attachment C.9. The rules are complex, but on the test set they
achieve Recall 0.83 and F1 Score 0.86.
The rules for classes representing DDoS intrusions are much better. They are




1. Fwd Pkts/s ≤ 214905.9764
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 28852.3201
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14678.0294
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 1.0, F1 Score = 0.99
Table 4.3: Set of rules for class DDOS attack-HOIC.
For the training it requires only 5 the most important features. The training
creates only one rule with length of 3 and with 3 different features (see Table
4.3). On the test set it gives almost 1.0 for both Recall and F1 Score. The second
class is DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP. It uses only 3 the most important features.
However, it suffers from unbalanced classes. It needs a small up-sampling of the
minority class. The class does not contain many samples and the method for
creating rules is not able to create good rules. With up-sampling it creates one
rule with length of 3 and with 2 different features. The rule is presented in Table
4.4. This rule is a little bit worse, but still it achieves Recall 1.0. On the other
hand, F1 Score is poor and achieves 0.07 only. The last DDoS class is DDoS
attacks-LOIC-HTTP. The training uses 5 the most important features. However,
the training is unable to find rules with length of 3 and the parameter max depth
has to be increased to 10 and the parameter n estimators has to be increased to
40. Also the selection of rules has to be less strict. The parameter precision min
is set to 0.2. Only after that the training creates 2 rules with minimum length of
4 and maximum length of 7 (see Attachment C.12). Recall of the rules is a little
bit lower, but on the other hand F1 Score is closed to 1.0.
DDOS attack-
LOIC-UDP
1. Fwd IAT Max ≤ 737245238.1083
∧ Fwd IAT Max > 737241580.5443
∧ Fwd IAT Std ≤ 378020739.7917
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.97, F1 Score = 0.07
Table 4.4: Set of rules for class DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP.
Next type of intrusion is DoS. The sets of rules for classes representing DoS
intrusions perform also well, but they need more rules. Parameters for the training
are almost the same for every DoS class. The first class is DoS attacks-GoldenEye.
The training uses 10 the most important features and creates 4 rules with length
of 5 and with only 6 features (see Attachment C.14). The rules achieve almost 1.0
in both accuracy measures. The second class is DoS attacks-Slowloris. During
the training it reduces 23 passed features on only 9 features. The training creates
3 rules with length of 3 and 1 rule with length of 4 (see Attachment C.13).
The performance of rules is similar. The third class is DoS attacks-Hulk. In
comparison with previous DoS intrusions, this class may be easier to separate.
The training creates only 1 rule with length of 3 and with 3 different features.
The rule is presented in Table 4.5. From 10 passed the most important features
it uses only 3. The rule achieves very similar results as the rules for the previous
DoS classes. Last DoS class is DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTest. Here the training
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uses 8 the most important features. It creates 2 rules with length of 3 and with
3 different features (see Table 4.6). However, F1 Score is a little bit lower, but
still Recall is almost 1.0.
DoS
attacks-Hulk
1. Fwd IAT Min ≤ 835816163.0157
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 35.7566
∧ Tot Bwd Pkts ≤ 170.8652
Params: n estimators = 40, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.97, F1 Score = 0.98
Table 4.5: Set of rules for class DoS attacks-Hulk.
Classes representing Brute Force intrusion are easy to detect too. They do
not need too long and too many rules. Setting the maximal length to 3 is enough.
Class FTP-BruteForce uses only 3 features for the training and the result is 2
rules with length of 3 and 1 rule with length of 2. The rules are attached in
Attachment C.4. The rules detect the FTP-BruteForce intrusion very well. They
achieve Recall 1.0 and F1 Score 0.73. The last class of the Brute Force intrusion
is SSH-BruteForce. The rules need more features for the training. The training
creates 2 rules with length of 3 and with 4 different features. The rules are
presented in Table 4.7. Their performance is better in case of F1 Score, but
Recall is 0.97. On the other hand both classes are classified very well.
The worst intrusion for rules is Infiltration. Even the Decision Tree is not
able to fully detect the intrusion and needs many features. In case of creating
rules, it is more difficult. The more features it has the more unfeasible it is. The
Decision Tree uses 63 features. However, the method for creating rules is not able
to finish the training with 63 features. Another problem is the length of rules.
With using 63 features rules may have length of 63 and more. It would be too
long. The number of features is reduced to finish the training of rules. If the
training has only 24 features, it is able to reach the end. However, it is unable to
provide any rules. The parameter max depth is increased to 10, but it is unable
to create rules even with length of 10. There may be some rules for Infiltration,
but the rules may be too long or they may need more features than 24. Longer
rules with more features are almost same like the Decision Tree and does not give




1. Bwd Pkts/s > 91987.0181
∧ Flow Pkts/s ≤ 783666.1556
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 54.1508
2. Flow Pkts/s ≤ 783666.1556
∧ Flow Pkts/s > 533773.4194
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 54.1508
Params: n estimators = 40, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.99, F1 Score = 0.68
Table 4.6: Set of rules for class DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTests.
Similar difficult intrusion for detecting is SQL Injection. Compared to Infil-
tration, SQL Injection does not have too many the most important features and
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it is possible to find some rules. The training uses 10 the most important features.
It does not need too long rules. The results are achieved with the maximal length
set to 5. It is another class that suffers from unbalanced classes. However, the
up-sampling works well. The training creates 5 rules with 8 different features (see
Attachment C.7). The performance of the rules is similar to the performance of
the rules for web intrusions such as Brute Force -Web. F1 Score is very poor and
Recall is only 0.55.
The rules are also tested in the multiclass classification. The previous per-
formance results are only for the binary classification and do not give a wider
view on rule-based intrusion detection. Each rule is only binary classifier that
provides {0, 1} values. There is no probability distribution, so only one rule can
be selected for classification one sample. During the training rules are selected
based on their Precision, Recall and Out-of-Bag error (OOB). These values can
be used for selecting the appropriate rule for a sample classification. The rules
can be sorted by one of the performance measure. After sorting the rules, the
most appropriate rule is the first satisfying rule. The rules are sorted by each
performance measure, but the best order of the rules is the order given by Pre-
cision. The classification is tested in two ways. The first way is to use all rules.
The second way is to use only rules for intrusions and remove the rules for Benign
class. However, in both cases there can be a problem that some rules may not
satisfy any rule. In the first case, it can be solved by classifying the unrecog-
nized samples as Infiltration. Infiltration is the only class that does not have any
rule, so the unrecognized samples may be Infiltration. In the second case, it is
more simple. The unrecognized samples are classified as Benign class, because
the rules for Benign class are removed. The best performing classification is with
using only rules for intrusions. The rules for Benign class are not very good, so
it is better to classify unrecognized samples as Benign class than as Infiltration
class. The result is presented in Figure 4.1.
Some final rules are only generalization of another rule or more rules can be
put together into one rule. In case of binary classification, where order of the
rules does not matter, the rules can be simplified. However, in case of multiclass
classification it can not be done, because the order of the rules would be lost and
the order is very important. Also the rules may be more clear in the original
form and human experts can decide which rule to use or how to modify it for
their system. Let us now compare the results of the rules and the results of the
Decision Tree, that has the best results among tested models.
SSH-
BruteForce
1. Bwd Pkts/s > 90301.7439
∧ Fwd Header Len > 12813.2019
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14663.8164
2. Bwd Pkts/s > 110391.2570
∧ Fwd Header Len ≤ 12813.2019
∧ Bwd Header Len > 3399.2300
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 5, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.97, F1 Score = 0.98
Table 4.7: Set of rules for class SSH-BruteForce.
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4.2 Comparison
This section discusses comparison of the Decision Tree and the set of rules. First
of all, the Decision Tree is a more complex model than the set of rules, but the
set of rules can be created from the Decision Tree, so the set of rules may reflect
some Decision Tree. However, the set of rules should be small and the rules
should be short and simple otherwise the Decision Tree can be used instead of
rules. The rules for intrusions are created in this manner. The Decision Tree
serves to provide only the best results and the set of rules tries to achieve the
same results, but it tries to stay as simple as possible. Let us now go through each
intrusion and compare both results. The comparison of both results is presented
in Attachment C.17.
Class Benign is not fully classified in both cases, but the Decision Tree per-
forms better. The rules have smaller Recall and F1 Score, but for only 2 rules
it is not big trade-off between performance and simplicity. For class Bot both
classifiers achieve similar good results. Only small difference is in Recall, where
it differs by 0.03, but this is the only price for getting only 2 short rules. Next
class Brute Force -Web is not easy for both classifiers. The rules are again worse,
but both classifiers would not detect all Brute Force -Web intrusions. Similar
intrusion Brute Force -XSS has different results. The Decision Tree is better in
Recall but has very poor F1 Score. Compared to that, the rules have smaller Re-
call than the Decision Tree, but has high F1 Score. However, higher Recall may
be more appropriate within the intrusion detection. Classes DDOS attack-HOIC
and DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP are not very interesting, because the results are
almost the same, but class DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP is exceptional for the rules.
In this case, the rules are better in Recall and the Decision Tree is better in F1
Score. Only 1 good rule is able to detect almost every DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP.
Classes representing DoS intrusions have no big difference in results, but the rules
perform a little bit worse in case of Recall. Class FTP-BruteForce is another ex-
ception. The rules for this class have better Recall than the Decision Tree and
have similar F1 Score like the Decision Tree. The worst case for the rules is class
Infiltration. Here the rules fail and only the Decision Tree is able to detect at
least something, but even the Decision Tree has poor results. It is able to detect
only half of Infiltration intrusions. Similar difficult intrusion is SQL Injection.
The Decision Tree is able to detect only half of SQL Injection intrusions, but the
rules are able to detect more than half. However, rules have very low F1 Score,
but the rules may be more suitable for an intrusion detection system. The last
class is SSH-BruteForce, where again is no big difference in results. Only 2 short
rules can achieve almost the same result like the Decision Tree.
In multiclass classification, it is more clear that the rules have similar results
as the Decision Tree. Both the rules and the Decision Tree achieve Precision
and Recall 0.97 (see Figure 4.1 and 3.7). The rules are better only in classifying
classes – Benign, DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP, FTP-BruteForce and SQL Injection.
In other cases, the rules are worse than the Decision Tree except class DDOS
attack-HOIC, where the results are same.
In general, the rules have the same results in case of TN and FP for all classes.
F1 Score is the same or better for classes Bot, Brute Force -XSS and DoS attack-
SlowHTTPTest. TP and FN is the same or better for classes DDoS attack-
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HOIC, DDoS attack-LOIC-UDP, FTP-BruteForce and SQL Injection. However,
all rules may be used in the intrusion detection system except few rules. From
the comparison above can be seen that trade-off between human readability and
performance is not very big in most cases. The rules are able to achieve almost
the same results like the Decision Tree, but human experts can easily understand
them and adapt their intrusion detection systems.
Figure 4.1: Confusion matrix for multiclass rules. The rules are sorted by their
performance measure and then the classification is made based on their order.
Each sample is classified only by the first satisfying rule. In this case the rules are
sorted by their Precision. If any rule is not met, then it is classified as Benign.
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Conclusion
This work presents rules for intrusion detection and their comparison with model
that achieves the best current results. Models and rules are trained on realistic
dataset for intrusion detection created by the Communications Security Estab-
lishment and the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity. The dataset is called
CSE-CIC-IDS2018[1][2]. The objective of this work was to create simple and
short rules that achieve similar results as the best performing model.
The first practical part explores performance of various models. Linear, non-
linear, Decision Tree and ensemble models are tested. Results show that the best
model is the Decision Tree. It is able to detect most intrusions. However, some
of them are more difficult and it does not perform very well. Compared to results
achieved by Qianru Zhou and Dimitrios Pezaros[6], the Decision Tree gives very
similar results. These results are used for the comparison with results of the rules.
The second practical part presents the final rules for each intrusion. The
rules are created from an ensemble of trees. The method for extracting rules
from an ensemble of trees is proposed by Jerome H. Friedman and Bogdan E.
Popescu[28][29]. For most intrusions the rules achieve similar or even better re-
sults than the Decision Tree and still they are short and simple. However, the
rules perform badly for some problematic intrusions such as Infiltration. Infiltra-
tion is the only case, where the rules completely fail. On the other hand, it is also
difficult for the Decision Tree. Each intrusion is classified by a maximum of five
rules, but most intrusions are classified by one or two short rules. The rules use
at most 12 features from 80 existing features, but usually the number is lower.
The objective of this work is met and the rules were created for each type of
intrusion except one. The intrusion Infiltration is difficult to detect for all models
and more difficult for simple rules. The rules are simple and short, so human
experts may easily understand them and adapt their defense against intrusions.
It may be used in rule-based intrusion systems too. One of the systems that
allows to configure custom rules for anomaly detection is IBM QRadar SIEM1.
However, even without such systems the rules can be deployed as a simple model
for intrusion detection. The results were provided to partner organization that
uses an intrusion detection system. Unfortunately, because of current epidemic
situation it was not possible to compare the results with their intrusion detection
system.
Rules in this work are extracted from an ensemble of Decision Trees, but there
are also different methods for creating rules. It may be interesting to create rules
by different method and compare obtained rules. One of the interesting methods
may be Evolutionary Algorithms, namely method Michigan and Pittsburgh. In
case of machine learning models, it may be interesting to use an ensemble method
Stacking to get better results in difficult intrusions. Each model may be better
in detecting different samples and may have different advantages. The Stacking
can combine different models together and improve their final results. Another
experiment may be to include time of samples. It would require to sort the data
1How to create custom rules can be found on page https://www.ibm.com/support/
knowledgecenter/en/SS42VS_7.3.1/com.ibm.qradar.doc/c_qradar_rul_mgt.html. The
main page of IBM QRadar SIEM is on https://www.ibm.com/products/qradar-siem.
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by their timestamp. Then a model can take in account a history of predictions.
For example, if last four predictions are Infiltration with the probability 0.4, then
the fifth prediction can increase its probability that it is Infiltration. Simpler
experiment may be to select the best classifier for each intrusion and combine
them by One-vs-All or One-vs-One method. It may help to get better results
without using complicated method.
50
Bibliography
[1] CSE-CIC-IDS2018 on AWS. https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/
ids-2018.html, Accessed on 2020-3-18.
[2] A Realistic Cyber Defense Dataset (CSE-CIC-IDS2018). https://
registry.opendata.aws/cse-cic-ids2018/, Accessed on 2020-3-18.
[3] Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset (CICIDS2017). https://www.unb.
ca/cic/datasets/ids-2017.html, Accessed on 2020-3-18.
[4] Arash Habibi Lashkari., Gerard Draper Gil., Mohammad Saiful Islam Ma-
mun., and Ali A. Ghorbani. Characterization of Tor Traffic using Time
based Features. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Infor-
mation Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP, pages 253–262.
INSTICC, SciTePress, 2017.
[5] Iman Sharafaldin, Arash Habibi Lashkari, and Ali A. Ghorbani. Toward
Generating a New Intrusion Detection Dataset and Intrusion Traffic Char-
acterization. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Infor-
mation Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP, pages 108–116.
INSTICC, SciTePress, 2018.
[6] Qianru Zhou and Dimitrios Pezaros. Evaluation of Machine Learning Clas-
sifiers for Zero-Day Intrusion Detection - An Analysis on CIC-AWS-2018
dataset. CoRR, abs/1905.03685, 2019. http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.
03685.
[7] V. Kanimozhi and T. P. Jacob. Artificial Intelligence based Network Intru-
sion Detection with Hyper-Parameter Optimization Tuning on the Realistic
Cyber Dataset CSE-CIC-IDS2018 using Cloud Computing. In 2019 Interna-
tional Conference on Communication and Signal Processing (ICCSP), pages
33–36, April 2019.
[8] T. Chadza, K. G. Kyriakopoulos, and S. Lambotharan. Contemporary Se-
quential Network Attacks Prediction using Hidden Markov Model. In 2019
17th International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), pages
1–3, Aug 2019.
[9] KDD’99 dataset. http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/, Irvine, CA, USA,
Accesed on 2020-3-18.
[10] Ugo Fiore, Francesco Palmieri, Aniello Castiglione, and Alfredo De Santis.
Network anomaly detection with the restricted Boltzmann machine. Neuro-
computing, 122:13–23, 2013.
[11] Mostafa A. Salama, Heba F. Eid, Rabie A. Ramadan, Ashraf Darwish, and
Aboul Ella Hassanien. Hybrid Intelligent Intrusion Detection Scheme. Ad-
vances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, Springer, 96:293–303, 2011.
51
[12] Md. Zahangir Alom, VenkataRamesh Bontupalli, and Tarek M. Taha. Intru-
sion detection using deep belief networks. In 2015 National Aerospace and
Electronics Conference (NAECON), pages 339–344, 2015.
[13] Jihyun Kim, Jaehyun Kim, Huong Le Thi Thu, and Howon Kim. Long
Short Term Memory Recurrent Neural Network Classifier for Intrusion De-
tection. 2016 International Conference on Platform Technology and Service
(PlatCon), pages 1–5, 2016.
[14] Wafaa Anani and Jagath Samarabandu. Comparison of Recurrent Neu-
ral Network Algorithms for Intrusion Detection Based on Predicting Packet
Sequences. 2018 IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer
Engineering (CCECE), pages 1–4, 2018.
[15] Intrusion detection evaluation dataset (ISCXIDS2012). https://www.unb.
ca/cic/datasets/ids.html, Accessed on 2020-3-18.
[16] CICFlowMeter (formerly ISCXFlowMeter). https://www.unb.ca/cic/
research/applications.html#CICFlowMeter, Accessed on 2020-3-18.
[17] What is a Botnet? https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/
threats/botnet-attacks, Accessed on 2020-3-20.
[18] What is a Botnet Attack - Definition. https://www.akamai.com/us/en/
resources/what-is-a-botnet.jsp, Accessed on 2020-3-20.
[19] What is a brute force attack? https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/
bots/brute-force-attack/, Accessed on 2020-3-20.
[20] What is a denial-of-service attack? https://www.cloudflare.com/
learning/ddos/glossary/denial-of-service/, Accessed on 2020-3-20.
[21] What is Cross-site Scripting and How Can You Fix it? https://
www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/cross-site-scripting/, Accessed
on 2020-3-20.
[22] What is SQL Injection (SQLi) and How to Prevent it. https://www.
acunetix.com/websitesecurity/sql-injection/, Accessed on 2020-3-20.
[23] Thomas M. Mitchell. Machine learning. McGraw-Hill, 1997.
[24] Uday Kamath, John Liu, and James Whitaker. Deep learning for NLP
and speech recognition, chapter Basics of Machine Learning, pages 39–86.
Springer, 2019.
[25] Trevor Hastie, Jerome Friedman, and Robert Tisbshirani. The Elements of
statistical learning: data mining, inference, and prediction, chapter Support
Vector Machines and Flexible Discriminants, pages 417–438. Springer, 2017.





[27] Trevor Hastie, Jerome Friedman, and Robert Tisbshirani. The Elements
of statistical learning: data mining, inference, and prediction, chapter Tree-
Based Methods, pages 305–317. Springer, 2017.
[28] Jerome H. Friedman and Bogdan E. Popescu. Predictive learning via rule
ensembles. The Annals of Applied Statistics, 2(3):916–954, Sep 2008.
[29] Jerome H. Friedman and Bogdan E. Popescu. Gradient Directed Regulariza-
tion, 2004. http://statweb.stanford.edu/˜jhf/ftp/pathlite.pdf, Ac-
cessed on 2020-3-23.
[30] Skope-Rules. https://github.com/scikit-learn-contrib/
skope-rules, Accessed on 2020-3-23.
[31] Trevor Hastie, Jerome Friedman, and Robert Tisbshirani. The Elements of
statistical learning: data mining, inference, and prediction, chapter Unsu-
pervised Learning, pages 485–579. Springer, 2017.
[32] Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio, and Aaron Courville. Deep learning, chapter
Linear Algebra, pages 45–49. The MIT Press, 2017.
[33] Laurens van der Maaten and Geoffrey Hinton. Visualizing Data using t-SNE.
Journal of Machine Learning Research 9, 2008.
[34] Visualizing Data using t-SNE. https://wiki.math.uwaterloo.ca/
statwiki/index.php?title=visualizing_Data_using_t-SNE, Accessed
on 2020-4-16.
[35] J. D. Hunter. Matplotlib: A 2D graphics environment. Computing in Science
and Engineering, 9(3):90–95, 2007.
[36] F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel, B. Thirion, O. Grisel,
M. Blondel, P. Prettenhofer, R. Weiss, V. Dubourg, J. Vanderplas, A. Pas-
sos, D. Cournapeau, M. Brucher, M. Perrot, and E. Duchesnay. Scikit-




1 Trade off between security and price. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1 Network topology[1]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Classes ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Binary Confusion Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Example of possible separating hyperplanes and the optimal sep-
arating hyperplane[26]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Example of SVM and its slack variables for a not linear separable
problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Tree Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1 The graphs show the first two principal components of PCA. The
x axis represents the first principal component and the y axis rep-
resents the second principal component. Only part of the data
samples is transformed by PCA to reduce the computation com-
plexity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 The graph shows the explained variance ratio. The explained vari-
ance ratio reaches value 1.0 around the first 30 principal com-
ponents. The first 30 principal components may be considered
sufficient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Confusion matrix for multiclass Logistic Regression (One-vs-All). 37
3.4 Confusion matrix for multiclass Random Forest with 200 trees. . . 38
3.5 Confusion matrix for multiclass SVM with RBF kernel (One-vs-
All). The SVM is trained on small part of the data with size
827 651 samples. The small part of the data tries to preserve
classes ratio as much as possible with respect to a minimal number
of samples for one class and except Benign class. . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.6 Confusion matrix for AdaBoost with 400 stumps (very small De-
cision Trees). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.7 Confusion matrix for multiclass Decision Tree (One-vs-All). The
Decision Trees are trained on the most important features only. . 40
4.1 Confusion matrix for multiclass rules. The rules are sorted by their
performance measure and then the classification is made based on
their order. Each sample is classified only by the first satisfying
rule. In this case the rules are sorted by their Precision. If any
rule is not met, then it is classified as Benign. . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.1 Features Boxplots part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A.1 Features Boxplots part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.1 Features Boxplots part 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
A.1 Features Boxplots part 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.1 Features Boxplots part 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
54
List of Tables
4.1 Set of rules for class Benign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2 Set of rules for class Bot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3 Set of rules for class DDOS attack-HOIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.4 Set of rules for class DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP. . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5 Set of rules for class DoS attacks-Hulk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.6 Set of rules for class DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTests. . . . . . . . . . 45
4.7 Set of rules for class SSH-BruteForce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.1 Dataset contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A.2 Features Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.1 Three different feature importance – Logistic Regression, Decision
Tree and ANOVA. The features are sorted by their importance. . 65
B.2 Table compares results of the Logistic Regression and the Decision
Tree. Better results are highlighted. Recall is equal to TP in this
case. Values TN , FN , TP and FP are normalized. Value F1 is
F1 Score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.3 Table compares results of the Logistic Regression and the SVM.
Better results are highlighted. Recall is equal to TP in this case.
Values TN , FN , TP and FP are normalized. Value F1 is F1 Score. 70
B.4 Table compares results of the Decision Tree and the SVM. Better
results are highlighted. Recall is equal to TP in this case. Values
TN , FN , TP and FP are normalized. Value F1 is F1 Score. . . . 70
C.1 Table presents the features that are used for the rules training and
the features that are used in the final trained rules. The training
features are selected based on the Decision Tree feature importance
(see Table B.1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
C.2 Set of rules for class Benign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
C.3 Set of rules for class Bot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
C.4 Set of rules for class FTP-BruteForce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
C.5 Set of rules for class Infiltration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
C.6 Set of rules for class SSH-BruteForce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
C.7 Set of rules for class SQL Injection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
C.8 Set of rules for class Brute Force -Web. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
C.9 Set of rules for class Brute Force -XSS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
C.10 Set of rules for class DDOS attack-HOIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
C.11 Set of rules for class DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP. . . . . . . . . . . . 79
C.12 Set of rules for class DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP. . . . . . . . . . . 79
C.13 Set of rules for class DoS attacks-Slowloris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
C.14 Set of rules for class DoS attacks-GoldenEye. . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
C.15 Set of rules for class DoS attacks-Hulk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
C.16 Set of rules for class DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTests. . . . . . . . . . 80
C.17 Table compares results of the simple rules and the Decision Tree.
Better results are highlighted. Recall is equal to TP in this case.
Values TN , FN , TP and FP are normalized. Value F1 is F1 Score. 81
55
A. Attachment - Dataset
















































Table A.2: Features Description
Begin of Table A.2
Feature Name Description
Flow Duration Flow duration
Tot Fwd Pkts Total packets in the forward direction
Tot Bwd Pkts Total packets in the backward direction
TotLen Fwd Pkts Total size of packet in forward direction
Fwd Pkt Len Max Maximum size of packet in forward direction
Fwd Pkt Len Min Minimum size of packet in forward direction
Fwd Pkt Len Mean Mean size of packet in forward direction
Fwd Pkt Len Std Standard deviation size of packet in forwarddirection
Bwd Pkt Len Max Maximum size of packet in backward direc-tion
Bwd Pkt Len Min Minimum size of packet in backward direc-tion
Bwd Pkt Len Mean Mean size of packet in backward direction
Bwd Pkt Len Std Standard deviation size of packet in back-ward direction
Flow Byts/s flow byte rate that is number of packetstransferred per second
Flow Pkts/s flow packets rate that is number of packetstransferred per second
Flow IAT Mean Mean time between two flows
Flow IAT Std Standard deviation time two flows
Flow IAT Max Maximum time between two flows
Flow IAT Min Minimum time between two flows
Fwd IAT Tot Total time between two packets sent in theforward direction
Fwd IAT Mean Mean time between two packets sent in theforward direction
Fwd IAT Std Standard deviation time between two packetssent in the forward direction
Fwd IAT Max Maximum time between two packets sent inthe forward direction
Fwd IAT Min Minimum time between two packets sent inthe forward direction
Bwd IAT Tot Total time between two packets sent in thebackward direction
Bwd IAT Mean Mean time between two packets sent in thebackward direction
Bwd IAT Std Standard deviation time between two packetssent in the backward direction
Bwd IAT Max Maximum time between two packets sent inthe backward direction
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Continuation of Table A.2
Feature Name Description
Bwd IAT Min Minimum time between two packets sent inthe backward direction
Fwd PSH Flags
Number of times the PSH flag was set in
packets travelling in the forward direction (0
for UDP)
Bwd PSH Flags
Number of times the PSH flag was set in
packets travelling in the backward direction
(0 for UDP)
Fwd URG Flags
Number of times the URG flag was set in
packets travelling in the forward direction (0
for UDP)
Bwd URG Flags
Number of times the URG flag was set in
packets travelling in the backward direction
(0 for UDP)
Fwd Header Len Total bytes used for headers in the forwarddirection
Bwd Header Len Total bytes used for headers in the forwarddirection
Fwd Pkts/s Number of forward packets per second
Bwd Pkts/s Number of backward packets per second
Pkt Len Min Minimum length of a flow
Pkt Len Max Maximum length of a flow
Pkt Len Mean Mean length of a flow
Pkt Len Std Standard deviation length of a flow
Pkt Len Var Minimum inter-arrival time of packet
FIN Flag Cnt Number of packets with FIN
SYN Flag Cnt Number of packets with SYN
RST Flag Cnt Number of packets with RST
PSH Flag Cnt Number of packets with PUSH
ACK Flag Cnt Number of packets with ACK
URG Flag Cnt Number of packets with URG
CWE Flag Count Number of packets with CWE
ECE Flag Cnt Number of packets with ECE
Down/Up Ratio Download and upload ratio
Pkt Size Avg Average size of packet
Fwd Seg Size Avg Average size observed in the forward direc-tion
Bwd Seg Size Avg Average size observed in the backward direc-tion
Fwd Byts/b Avg Average number of bytes bulk rate in the for-ward direction
Fwd Pkts/b Avg Average number of packets bulk rate in theforward direction
Fwd Blk Rate Avg Average number of bulk rate in the forwarddirection
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Continuation of Table A.2
Feature Name Description
Bwd Byts/b Avg Average number of bytes bulk rate in thebackward direction
Bwd Pkts/b Avg Average number of packets bulk rate in thebackward direction
Bwd Blk Rate Avg Average number of bulk rate in the backwarddirection
Subflow Fwd Pkts The average number of packets in a sub flowin the forward direction
Subflow Fwd Byts The average number of bytes in a sub flow inthe forward direction
Subflow Bwd Pkts The average number of packets in a sub flowin the backward direction
Subflow Bwd Byts The average number of bytes in a sub flow inthe backward direction
Init Fwd Win Byts Number of bytes sent in initial window in theforward direction
Init Bwd Win Byts # of bytes sent in initial window in the back-ward direction
Fwd Act Data Pkts # of packets with at least 1 byte of TCP datapayload in the forward direction
Fwd Seg Size Min Minimum segment size observed in the for-ward direction
Active Mean Mean time a flow was active before becomingidle
Active Std Standard deviation time a flow was active be-fore becoming idle
Active Max Maximum time a flow was active before be-coming idle
Active Min Minimum time a flow was active before be-coming idle
Idle Mean Mean time a flow was idle before becomingactive
Idle Std Standard deviation time a flow was idle be-fore becoming active
Idle Max Maximum time a flow was idle before becom-ing active
Idle Min Minimum time a flow was idle before becom-ing active
End of Table A.2
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Figure A.1: Features Boxplots part 1
60
Figure A.1: Features Boxplots part 2
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Figure A.1: Features Boxplots part 3
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Figure A.1: Features Boxplots part 4
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Figure A.1: Features Boxplots part 5
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B. Attachment - Model Training
B.1 Feature Importance
Table B.1: Three different feature importance – Logistic Regression, Decision
Tree and ANOVA. The features are sorted by their importance.
Begin of Table B.1






























































Continuation of Table B.1


































































































Continuation of Table B.1























































































1Infiltration is difficult to classify and it has many more important features in case of Logistic
Regression and Decision Tree, but only the most important are mentioned.
2SQL Injection is similar as Infiltration.
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Continuation of Table B.1




















End of Table B.1
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B.2 Results
Table B.2: Table compares results of the Logistic Regression and the Decision
Tree. Better results are highlighted. Recall is equal to TP in this case. Values
TN , FN , TP and FP are normalized. Value F1 is F1 Score.
Logistic Regression Decision TreeClass
TN FN TP FP F1 TN FN TP FP F1
Benign 0.87 0.2 0.8 0.13 0.88 0.95 0.01 0.99 0.05 0.99
Bot 0.82 0.0 1.0 0.18 0.17 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.99
Brute Force -
Web
0.89 0.12 0.88 0.11 0.0 1.0 0.22 0.78 0.0 0.75
Brute Force -
XSS
0.76 0.05 0.95 0.24 0.0 1.0 0.02 0.98 0.0 0.02
DDoS attack-
HOIC
0.95 0.0 1.0 0.05 0.65 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
DDoS attack-
LOIC-UDP
1.0 0.02 0.98 0.0 0.47 1.0 0.28 0.72 0.0 0.83
DDoS attack-
LOIC-HTTP
0.82 0.0 1.0 0.18 0.29 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
DoS attack-
Golden-Eye
0.89 0.0 1.0 0.11 0.04 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
DoS attack-
Hulk
0.81 0.01 0.99 0.19 0.24 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
DoS attack-
Slow-HTTP
0.98 0.0 1.0 0.01 0.52 0.99 0.0 1.0 0.01 0.59
DoS attack-
Slowloris
0.94 0.0 1.0 0.06 0.02 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
FTP-Brute-
Force
0.99 0.0 1.0 0.01 0.65 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.74
Infiltration 0.68 0.26 0.74 0.32 0.04 0.88 0.54 0.46 0.12 0.07
SQL Injection 0.73 0.35 0.65 0.27 0.0 1.0 0.55 0.45 0.0 0.2
SSH-Brute-
Force
1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.88 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
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Table B.3: Table compares results of the Logistic Regression and the SVM. Better
results are highlighted. Recall is equal to TP in this case. Values TN , FN , TP
and FP are normalized. Value F1 is F1 Score.
Logistic Regression SVMClass
TN FN TP FP F1 TN FN TP FP F1
Brute Force -
XSS
0.76 0.05 0.95 0.24 0.0 0.93 0.24 0.76 0.07 0.0
DoS attack-
Slow-HTTP
0.98 0.0 1.0 0.01 0.52 0.99 0.0 1.0 0.01 0.59
Infiltration 0.68 0.26 0.74 0.32 0.04 0.46 0.31 0.69 0.54 0.03
SQL Injection 0.73 0.35 0.65 0.27 0.0 0.99 0.7 0.3 0.01 0.0
Table B.4: Table compares results of the Decision Tree and the SVM. Better
results are highlighted. Recall is equal to TP in this case. Values TN , FN , TP
and FP are normalized. Value F1 is F1 Score.
Decision Tree SVMClass
TN FN TP FP F1 TN FN TP FP F1
Brute Force -
XSS
1.0 0.02 0.98 0.0 0.02 0.93 0.24 0.76 0.07 0.0
DoS attack-
Slow-HTTP
0.99 0.0 1.0 0.01 0.59 0.99 0.0 1.0 0.01 0.59
Infiltration 0.88 0.54 0.46 0.12 0.07 0.46 0.31 0.69 0.54 0.03
SQL Injection 1.0 0.55 0.45 0.0 0.2 0.99 0.7 0.3 0.01 0.0
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C. Attachment - Rules
C.1 Features
Table C.1: Table presents the features that are used for the rules training and
the features that are used in the final trained rules. The training features are
selected based on the Decision Tree feature importance (see Table B.1).
Begin of Table C.1
Class Training Features Final Features
Benign
Idle Min, Fwd IAT
Tot, Bwd IAT Std,
Bwd IAT Mean, PSH
Flag Cnt, Active Std,
Flow Pkts/s, Fwd Pkt
Len Max, Bwd Pkts/s,
Bwd IAT Tot, URG
Flag Cnt, Bwd IAT
Max, Bwd IAT Min,
Fwd IAT Mean, Init
Bwd Win Byts, Fwd
Pkts/s, Fwd Header
Len, Flow Duration,
Bwd Seg Size Avg,
Fwd IAT Std, Bwd
Pkt Len Mean, Fwd
Seg Size Min, Init Fwd
Win Byts, Dst Port,
Subflow Fwd Byts
Init Fwd Win Byts,
Dst Port, Subflow
Fwd Byts
Bot Bwd Pkt Len Mean,Dst Port
Bwd Pkt Len Mean,
Dst Port
Brute Force -Web
Fwd IAT Min, Flow
Pkts/s, Down/Up
Ratio, Fwd Pkts/s,
Bwd IAT Mean, Bwd
Pkts/s, Flow IAT




Mean, Flow IAT Max,
Dst Port, Init Fwd
Win Byts
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Continuation of Table C.1
Class Training Features Final Features
Brute Force -XSS
Fwd IAT Max, Flow
IAT Min, Bwd Pkt
Len Max, Idle Min,
Init Bwd Win Byts,
Fwd IAT Min, Fwd
Act Data Pkts, Fwd
Header Len, Fwd IAT
Std, Bwd Pkt Len
Std, Bwd IAT Min,
Fwd Seg Size Avg,
Flow IAT Max, Flow
Byts/s, Bwd IAT Tot,
Fwd Seg Size Min, Init
Fwd Win Byts, Bwd
IAT Max, Dst Port,
Bwd Pkts/s
Bwd Pkt Len Max,
Idle Min, Fwd IAT
Std, Bwd Pkt Len Std,
Bwd IAT Min, Fwd
Seg Size Avg, Flow
IAT Max, Bwd IAT
Tot, Init Fwd Win
Byts, Bwd IAT Max,
Dst Port, Bwd Pkts/s
DDOS attack-HOIC
ACK Flag Cnt, Flow
IAT Max, Fwd Pkts/s,
Init Fwd Win Byts,
Dst Port
Fwd Pkts/s, Init Fwd
Win Byts, Dst Port
DDOS attack-LOIC-
UDP
Idle Min, Fwd IAT
Max, Fwd IAT Std




Init Fwd Win Byts,
Dst Port, Flow IAT
Min, Flow Duration,
Bwd Pkt Len Std
Init Fwd Win Byts,
Dst Port, Flow IAT
Min, Flow Duration,
Bwd Pkt Len Std
DoS attacks-
GoldenEye
Pkt Len Var, TotLen
Fwd Pkts, Pkt Len
Max, Subflow Bwd
Byts, Fwd Seg Size
Min, Bwd IAT Std,
Init Fwd Win Byts,
Flow IAT Mean, Flow
IAT Min, Bwd Pkt
Len Std
Pkt Len Var, Subflow
Bwd Byts, Fwd Seg
Size Min, Init Fwd
Win Byts, Flow IAT
Min, Bwd Pkt Len Std
DoS attacks-Hulk
Fwd Pkt Len Max,
Dst Port, Bwd Pkt
Len Std, Subflow Bwd
Byts, Flow Byts/s,
Fwd IAT Min, Fwd
Seg Size Min, Tot Bwd
Pkts
Fwd IAT Min, Fwd
Seg Size Min, Tot Bwd
Pkts
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Continuation of Table C.1
Class Training Features Final Features
DoS attacks-
SlowHTTPTest
Bwd IAT Std, Bwd
IAT Max, Init Fwd
Win Byts, Dst Port,
Bwd Pkts/s, Flow
Pkts/s, Fwd Pkts/s,
Fwd Seg Size Min
Bwd Pkts/s, Flow
Pkts/s, Fwd Seg Size
Min
DoS attacks-Slowloris
Fwd Pkt Len Mean,
Flow Byts/s, Active
Min, Flow IAT Std,
Pkt Len Var, Fwd
Header Len, Fwd Act
Data Pkts, Flow Du-
ration, Pkt Len Std,
Subflow Bwd Pkts,
Fwd Pkts/s, Bwd Pkt
Len Std, Bwd Pkt Len
Max, Pkt Size Avg,
Init Fwd Win Byts,
Fwd PSH Flags, Idle
Min, Fwd IAT Mean,
Fwd IAT Min, Dst
Port, Pkt Len Mean,
Fwd Seg Size Min,
Bwd IAT Max
Flow IAT Std, Pkt
Len Var, Pkt Len Std,
Fwd IAT Mean, Fwd
IAT Min, Dst Port,
Pkt Len Mean, Fwd




Pkts/s, Fwd Seg Size
Min
Bwd Pkts/s, Flow
Pkts/s, Fwd Seg Size
Min
Infiltration
Active Std, Tot Fwd
Pkts, Tot Bwd Pkts,
Idle Max, Subflow
Bwd Pkts, Idle Mean,
Idle Std, Subflow Bwd
Byts, Active Max,
Down/Up Ratio, Ac-
tive Mean, URG Flag
Cnt, Idle Min, Bwd
Header Len, Subflow
Fwd Byts, Active
Min, PSH Flag Cnt,
Pkt Len Min, TotLen
Fwd Pkts, Fwd Pkt
Len Min, Fwd IAT
Min, Flow IAT Std,




Continuation of Table C.1
Class Training Features Final Features
SQL Injection
Pkt Size Avg, Fwd
IAT Tot, ECE Flag
Cnt, Init Fwd Win
Byts, Fwd Seg Size
Min, Dst Port, Flow
IAT Std, Flow Du-
ration, Fwd Pkts/s,
Bwd Pkt Len Std
Pkt Size Avg, ECE
Flag Cnt, Init Fwd
Win Byts, Dst Port,
Flow IAT Std, Flow
Duration, Fwd Pkts/s,
Bwd Pkt Len Std
SSH-Bruteforce
URG Flag Cnt, Fwd
Pkt Len Min, Bwd
Pkts/s, Fwd Header
Len, Dst Port, Bwd
Header Len
Bwd Pkts/s, Fwd
Header Len, Dst Port,
Bwd Header Len




1. Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 25742.5261
∧ Dst Port ≤ 18521.5103
∧ Subflow Fwd Byts > 66699.3250
2. Dst Port > 19464.6142
∧ Subflow Fwd Byts ≤ 66699.3250
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.75, F1 Score = 0.85
Table C.2: Set of rules for class Benign.
Bot
1. Bwd Pkt Len Mean ≤ 85.4608
∧ Dst Port ≤ 18528.3875
∧ Dst Port > 18527.4706
2. Bwd Pkt Len Mean > 85.4842
∧ Dst Port ≤ 18528.3875
∧ Dst Port > 18527.4706
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.97, F1 Score = 0.99
Table C.3: Set of rules for class Bot.
FTP-
BruteForce
1. Flow Pkts/s ≤ 783666.1556
∧ Flow Pkts/s > 671295.0020
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 54.1508
2. Flow Pkts/s > 783666.1556
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 54.1508
3. Bwd Pkts/s > 93423.9602
∧ Flow Pkts/s ≤ 671295.0020
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 54.1508
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 1.0, F1 Score = 0.73
Table C.4: Set of rules for class FTP-BruteForce.
Infiltration no simple rules
Params: no parameters
Performance: Recall = 0.0, F1 Score = 0.0




1. Bwd Pkts/s > 90301.7439
∧ Fwd Header Len > 12813.2019
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14663.8164
2. Bwd Pkts/s > 110391.2570
∧ Fwd Header Len ≤ 12813.2019
∧ Bwd Header Len > 3399.2300
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 5, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.97, F1 Score = 0.98
Table C.6: Set of rules for class SSH-BruteForce.
SQL Injection
1. Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 30698.5219
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14765.1416
∧ Flow IAT Std > 378019391.0692
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std > 643.6374
2. Pkt Size Avg ≤ 611.1219
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14765.1416
∧ Flow IAT Std ≤ 378033576.4034
∧ Flow IAT Std > 378018473.6098
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std > 643.6374
3. Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 12614.7340
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14678.0294
∧ Dst Port > 14675.2785
∧ Fwd Pkts/s > 219712.4913
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 643.6374
4. ECE Flag Cnt > 0.5421
∧ Flow IAT Std > 378021155.4142
∧ Flow Duration ≤ 551990567.7851
∧ Fwd Pkts/s ≤ 219718.2201
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 643.6374
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 5, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.55, F1 Score = 0.0




1. Fwd Seg Size Avg > 313.6182
∧ Bwd IAT Tot ≤ 34148496.5648
∧ Bwd IAT Max ≤ 10662392.4841
∧ Dst Port ≤ 30861.6375
∧ Bwd Pkts/s ≤ 90300.9751
∧ Idle Min ≤ 70714799.3529
∧ Fwd IAT Std ≤ 378084753.5283
∧ Fwd IAT Std > 378083434.4581
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 455.4881
2. Fwd Seg Size Avg > 313.6030
∧ Bwd IAT Tot > 34148496.5648
∧ Bwd IAT Max ≤ 10662392.4841
∧ Dst Port ≤ 30861.6375
∧ Bwd Pkts/s ≤ 90300.9751
∧ Fwd IAT Std > 378020739.7917
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 455.4881
3. Bwd IAT Min ≤ 4059161.2620
∧ Bwd IAT Min > 4058870.6302
∧ Fwd Seg Size Avg ≤ 313.6030
∧ Fwd Seg Size Avg > 126.2039
∧ Flow IAT Max > 737277924.5121
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 20784.4100
∧ Bwd IAT Max ≤ 11250202.4434
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14678.0294
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Max > 500.7399
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 371.1062
4. Fwd Seg Size Avg ≤ 319.8238
∧ Fwd Seg Size Avg > 313.6182
∧ Bwd IAT Max ≤ 10662392.4841
∧ Dst Port ≤ 30861.6375
∧ Bwd Pkts/s ≤ 90300.9751
∧ Fwd IAT Std > 378020739.7917
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 455.4881
5. Fwd Seg Size Avg ≤ 18.2701
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 12562.5791
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 12547.3142
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14678.0294
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 10, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.83, F1 Score = 0.86




1. Flow Pkts/s ≤ 536255.3098
∧ Fwd Pkts/s > 214388.4693
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14765.1416
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 12565.9713
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 12565.1233
2. Flow Pkts/s ≤ 536255.3098
∧ Fwd Pkts/s ≤ 226210.9299
∧ Fwd Pkts/s > 214388.4693
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14765.1416
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 12565.9713
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 12565.1233
3. Fwd Pkts/s ≤ 219615.1006
∧ Fwd Pkts/s > 214380.8310
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14765.1416
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 12565.9713
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 12565.1233
4. Bwd IAT Mean ≤ 4529860.4285
∧ Bwd IAT Mean > 4527198.0003
∧ Flow IAT Max ≤ 737246449.7924
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14690.8670
∧ Dst Port > 14663.8164
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 12565.9713
5. Flow Pkts/s > 532313.7548
∧ Fwd Pkts/s ≤ 219615.1006
∧ Fwd Pkts/s > 214388.4693
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14765.1416
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 12565.9713
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 12565.1233
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 7, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.57, F1 Score = 0.55
Table C.9: Set of rules for class Brute Force -XSS.
DDOS
attack-HOIC
1. Fwd Pkts/s ≤ 214905.9764
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 28852.3201
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14678.0294
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 1.0, F1 Score = 0.99




1. Fwd IAT Max ≤ 737245238.1083
∧ Fwd IAT Max > 737241580.5443
∧ Fwd IAT Std ≤ 378020739.7917
Params: n estimators = 30, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.97, F1 Score = 0.07
Table C.11: Set of rules for class DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP.
DDoS attacks-
LOIC-HTTP
1. Init Fwd Win Byts > 15199.5861
∧ Flow Duration ≤ 552009298.1353
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 432.4779
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std > 432.4645
2. Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 12571.0596
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 12306.4684
∧ Dst Port ≤ 14678.0294
∧ Dst Port > 14663.8164
∧ Flow IAT Min > 835815284.7113
∧ Flow Duration ≤ 552937620.9025
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 432.4645
Params: n estimators = 40, max depth = 10, precision min = 0.2 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.91, F1 Score = 0.95
Table C.12: Set of rules for class DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP.
DoS attacks-
Slowloris
1. Dst Port ≤ 14765.6001
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 35.7566
∧ Bwd IAT Max > 29358787.8421
∧ Pkt Len Var ≤ 165440.5593
2. Fwd IAT Mean > 249110549.4669
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 35.7566
∧ Bwd IAT Max > 29358370.0644
∧ Pkt Len Std ≤ 172.8473
3. Pkt Len Mean ≤ 153.3349
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 35.7566
∧ Bwd IAT Max > 29358787.8421
∧ Pkt Len Var > 161584.6258
4. Fwd IAT Mean ≤ 249083966.9954
∧ Fwd IAT Min > 835817956.7616
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 54.1508
∧ Bwd IAT Max ≤ 29358787.8421
∧ Flow IAT Std > 378017626.7242
Params: n estimators = 40, max depth = 5, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.96, F1 Score = 0.96




1. Pkt Len Var ≤ 211890.6134
∧ Subflow Bwd Byts > 244036.7271
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 35.7566
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 26359.9053
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std > 433.7868
2. Subflow Bwd Byts > 244036.7271
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 35.7566
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 26359.9053
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 500.8440
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std > 433.7868
3. Fwd Seg Size Min > 35.7566
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts ≤ 11596.6518
∧ Init Fwd Win Byts > 11590.2914
∧ Flow IAT Min > 835815745.7487
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 433.7868
4. Subflow Bwd Byts ≤ 244032.6823
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 35.7566
∧ Flow IAT Min ≤ 835815745.7487
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std ≤ 433.7868
∧ Bwd Pkt Len Std > 311.7684
Params: n estimators = 40, max depth = 5, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.97, F1 Score = 0.97
Table C.14: Set of rules for class DoS attacks-GoldenEye.
DoS
attacks-Hulk
1. Fwd IAT Min ≤ 835816163.0157
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 35.7566
∧ Tot Bwd Pkts ≤ 170.8652
Params: n estimators = 40, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.97, F1 Score = 0.98




1. Bwd Pkts/s > 91987.0181
∧ Flow Pkts/s ≤ 783666.1556
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 54.1508
2. Flow Pkts/s ≤ 783666.1556
∧ Flow Pkts/s > 533773.4194
∧ Fwd Seg Size Min > 54.1508
Params: n estimators = 40, max depth = 3, precision min = 0.3 and recall min = 0.1
Performance: Recall = 0.99, F1 Score = 0.68
Table C.16: Set of rules for class DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTests.
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C.3 Results
Table C.17: Table compares results of the simple rules and the Decision Tree.
Better results are highlighted. Recall is equal to TP in this case. Values TN ,
FN , TP and FP are normalized. Value F1 is F1 Score.
Simple Rules Decision TreeClass
TN FN TP FP F1 TN FN TP FP F1
Benign 0.95 0.25 0.75 0.05 0.85 0.95 0.01 0.99 0.05 0.99
Bot 1.0 0.03 0.97 0.0 0.99 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.99
Brute Force -
Web
1.0 0.43 0.57 0.0 0.55 1.0 0.22 0.78 0.0 0.75
Brute Force -
XSS
1.0 0.17 0.83 0.0 0.86 1.0 0.02 0.98 0.0 0.02
DDoS attack-
HOIC
1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.99 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
DDoS attack-
LOIC-UDP
1.0 0.03 0.97 0.0 0.07 1.0 0.28 0.72 0.0 0.83
DDoS attack-
LOIC-HTTP
1.0 0.09 0.91 0.0 0.95 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
DoS attack-
Golden-Eye
1.0 0.04 0.97 0.0 0.97 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
DoS attack-
Hulk
1.0 0.03 0.97 0.0 0.98 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
DoS attack-
Slow-HTTP
0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.68 0.99 0.0 1.0 0.01 0.59
DoS attack-
Slowloris
1.0 0.04 0.96 0.0 0.96 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
FTP-Brute-
Force
0.99 0.0 1.0 0.01 0.73 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.74
Infiltration 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.88 0.54 0.46 0.12 0.07
SQL Injection 1.0 0.45 0.55 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.55 0.45 0.0 0.2
SSH-Brute-
Force
1.0 0.03 0.97 0.0 0.98 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
81
D. Attachment - Digital Content
Results:
• folder statistics – It contains all computed statistics. The statistics are
stored as CSV files. There are statistics for the whole dataset, train set and
for each class.
• folder graphs – It contains all created graphs.
– subfolders box plots and box plots log – They contain created box plots
for each feature. The subfolder box plots contains graphs without any
feature transformation and the subfolder box plots log contains graphs
with logarithm of features.
– subfolder visualization – It contains the visualized data in 2 dimen-
sional space with using PCA.
– subfolder feature importance – It contains graphs of various feature
importance.
– subfolder confusion matrix – It contains all confusion matrices. There
are confusion matrices for each model, for each class and for multiclass
classification.
Python scripts:
• README.md – It contains a description of the scripts.
• script python/constants.py – It contains definitions of constants that are
used in another scripts.
• script python/data.py – It contains an implementation of Dataset class and
statements for downloading the dataset.
• script python/data analysis.py – It contains an implementation of Analyzer
class and methods for analyzing the dataset.
• script python/data transformation.py – It contains an implementation of
Transformer class and methods for the data transformation.
• script python/data visualization.py – It contains methods for the data vi-
sualization.
• script python/graphs.py – It contains methods for creating various graphs.
• script python/model training.py – It contains methods for computing the
feature importance, feature selection and model training.
• script python/rules.py – It contains methods for creating rules.
• folder python/conf – It contains configurations for the analysis.
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